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ABSTRACT 
 
 
JAPAN: REGIME CHANGE IN THE “LOST DECADE” 
 
 
by 
 
 
Tang Suk On Fiona 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
The shift in both the political and economic situations of Japan in the post-
1993s caught the attention of observers because the abrupt changes were unparalleled 
in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Politically, a single conservative party had dominated Japan’s electoral 
and government spheres in a way unmatched in any other industrialized democracy 
two-to-one majorities over the next largest party; complete control of all cabinet 
posts; and a relatively large influence of government over the economy. 
Economically too, Japan’s rapid growth had also been without parallel and had put it 
at the head of the countries called the “Asian dragons”. The national growth rates of 
Japan were also double those of other OECD countries in the postwar period; labour 
productivity in manufacturing and industry was far greater; unemployment and 
inflation were dramatically lower; saving rates of people remained consistently 
higher; and overseas investments and holdings exploded more dramatically. All these 
successes had shocked the rest of the world.  
 
 However, the loss of the dominance by the LDP and the end of the high 
growth of Japan's economy in the early 1990s contributed to what many Japanese 
have come to call the 'lost decade' and resulted in serious debates over the political 
and economic direction of Japan.  
 
This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. A theoretical model of 
regime change will be used to analyze the political and economic shift of Japan. 
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Chapter One  
 
Main theme of this Study 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In the 1990s Japan’s political economy was sharply different from what it had 
been two or three decades earlier. Thirty-eight years of electoral dominance by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had ended with the party’s internal fragmentation. 
The early 1990s seemed to have finally brought vindication to the perennial losers – 
the opposition parties. In 1989, the LDP lost an election and control of the House of 
Councilors (HC) of the Japanese Diet (Japan’s national legislature). This was 
followed in 1993 by the LDP losing control of the House of Representatives (HR), 
and by the first non-LDP government since the party’s formation in 1955. In July 
1993, an eight-party coalition supplied Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister since 
1955. 
 
Although the LDP remerged as the nation’s largest party and regained cabinet 
control following elections in 1996, it was not the same party it had been, nor did it 
enjoy any of its once sweeping dominance (Pempel, 1993, p. 175). Economically, the 
changes were equally striking. Four decades of unprecedented growth from the early 
1950s until the end of the 1980s came to an end with the simultaneous collapse of 
both stock and land prices, the collapse of numerous financial institutions, and at 
least $600 billion in unrecoverable loans (Pempel, 1998, p.212).  
 
The shift in both the political and economic situations of Japan caught the 
attention of observers because the abrupt changes were unparalleled in other 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the 
postwar period. Politically, a single conservative party had dominated Japan’s 
electoral and government spheres in a way unmatched in any other industrialized 
democracy two-to-one majorities over the next largest party; complete control of all 
cabinet posts; and a relatively large influence of government over the economy. 
Economically too, Japan’s rapid growth had also been without parallel and had put it 
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at the head of the countries called the “Asian dragons”. The national growth rates of 
Japan were also double those of other OECD countries in the postwar period; labour 
productivity in manufacturing and industry was far greater; unemployment and 
inflation were dramatically lower; saving rates of people remained consistently 
higher; and overseas investments and holdings exploded more dramatically. All these 
successes had shocked the rest of the world.  
 
 However, the loss of the dominance by the LDP and the end of the high growth 
of Japan's economy in the early 1990s contributed to what many Japanese have come 
to call the 'lost decade' and resulted in serious debates over the political and 
economic direction of Japan.  
 
 This thesis’s research questions, therefore, are (i) to examine the extent to which 
change has really occurred in the 1990s and (ii) to find out whether the change that 
Japan underwent in the 1990s can be considered as a ‘regime change’ (by utilising a 
theoretical model of regime change). The definitions of ‘regime’ and ‘regime change’ 
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, but the starting point will be the 
definition that the “regime consists of all those arrangements that regulate the way in 
which the demands put into the system are settled and the way in which decisions are 
put into the effect. They are the so-called rules of the game, in the light of which 
actions by members of the system are legitimated and accepted by the bulk of 
members as authoritative” (Easton, 1957, p.392). The working model of ‘regime 
change’ includes three main pillars, namely the domestic political institutions, public 
policy paradigm and socio-economic coalition. Detailed examination will be put on 
the description and analysis of changes happening in these three main pillars in 
Japan.  
 
This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. A theoretical model of 
regime change will be used to analyze the political and economic shift of Japan. I 
will analyze the content and context of the changes of Japan through a literature 
review from materials including books, journals, newspapers and internet sources in 
order to clarify the political and economic changes of Japan. Qualitative 
Historical-Comparative research approach will be used, as the 
Historical-Comparative research is suited for questions in which combinations of 
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factors produce a specific outcome. It is also appropriate for comparing entire 
systems, and to study long-term social change. Gobin (1998) states that the historical 
- comparative approach allows us to analyse such changes and justifies a broader 
scope. Comparison, having been considered initially an original and interesting 
approach with marginal status, is now beginning to be seen as an essential tool for 
generating knowledge. The comparative analysis by placing it within the historical 
context helps to generalize the knowledge in the present-day context through the 
study of past or particular time frame in the past. 
 
This research uses a historically-grounded comparative approach to examine the 
historical pre-conditions that underpinned the formation of LDP one party dominance 
regime, and then contrasts them with the conditions shaping the new coalition 
government regime of today. Given that the overall rules of the game in regimes are 
very different in the pre-1990s and post-1990s periods, the change of rules of the 
game ultimately generate the new relationships and structures of regime. Going 
beyond the comparative approach typology to place it within a strategic vision by 
placing emphasis on three components in the regime - the political institutions, the 
socio-economic coalition and the public policy paradigm - could draw a clear picture 
of the extent of regime change in Japan. With the guidance of the regime change 
model, a more comprehensive picture on the changes of Japan could be presented.  
 
In this thesis, the remainder of this chapter introduces the purpose of my 
research, the different levels of analysis and the importance of the concept of 
“political regime”, the literature review on the political system and political regime 
and, most importantly, the theoretical framework of regime changes. The second 
chapter discusses the political institutions of Japan from the post-war period to the 
early 2000s, focusing on the period from LDP dominance to the LDP-led 
government. The third chapter focuses on explaining the changes of the 
socio-economic conditions of Japan. The fourth chapter introduces the public policy 
paradigm and its changes in Japan in those two particular periods of time. The final 
chapter is the conclusion which summarizes my whole research. The references of 
my research are attached at the back. 
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2. Purpose of the research and levels of analysis 
 
There have been many scholars writing on the Japan’s political and economic 
development since the World War II, especially discussing the dominance of the LDP 
in Japan for 38 years and the recession in Japan’s economy since the early 1990s. 
However, the discussion often lacks a theoretical framework as a core structure for 
analysis. There is a need for a systematic approach to analyze the changes of the 
Japan’s political and economic development.  
 
As stated by Goldstein (1999, p.76), a level of analysis is a perspective of 
investigation based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggests possible 
explanations to “why questions”. Level of analysis can be divided into three levels – 
individual, national and international level. In this research, I will focus on the 
national level of analysis, which is concerned with the change in core elements of the 
political regime in Japan. The core elements of the regime would be elaborated later  
in this chapter. Before moving on to examining whether Japan has undergone a 
change in “political regime”, the difference between political system and political 
regime should be addressed first.   
 
 
3. The literature review on the importance of political system in political 
science 
 
When considering “political regime”, since the term is so ambiguous and 
difficult to define within clear boundaries and scopes, it is to a certain extent mixed 
up with the concept of political system. In common sense, system should include 
input, process and output, but the definition on what is “political system” is more 
complex and should need more explanations of the meaning. Through the discussion 
of the meaning of a “political system”, it is possible that the correlations between 
“political regime” and “political system” could be explored. 
 
The most authoritative author regarding the political system may be Easton, 
who wrote an article entitled the “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems” 
(1957). He argued that if “we hold the system of political actions as a unit before our 
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mind’s eye, as it were, we can see that what keeps the system going are inputs of 
various kinds. These inputs are converted by the processes of the system into outputs 
and these, in turn, have consequences both for the system and for the environment in 
which the system exists” (Easton, 1957, p.384). The formula is very simple and also 
very illuminating: inputs – political system or processes – outputs. Please refer to the 
following Figure 1. It is a model regarding the approach to the study of political life. 
 
Figure 1: An analysis of political system 
 
           DEMANDS                        DECISIONS       
INPUT                                                     OUTPUT 
           SUPPORT                         OR POLICIES 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
Political systems have certain properties; they contain (1) Properties of identification; 
(2) Inputs and outputs; (3) Differentiation within a system; (4) Integration of a 
system.  
 
The properties of identification distinguish a political system from other social 
systems, and we must be able to identify it by describing its fundamental units and 
establishing the boundaries that demarcate it from units outside the system. The 
properties of identification include units of a political system and the boundaries. The 
units are the elements of the system, while the boundaries were defined by all those 
actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for the 
society; every social action that does not contain of this characteristic will be 
excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external 
variable in the environment (Easton, 1957, p. 385).  
 
The input of a system include demand and support (as shown in Figure 1), As 
Easton (1957, p.387) stated “the reason why a political system emerges in a society 
at all – that is , why men engage in political activity – is that demands are being 
A 
POLITICAL
SYSTEM 
ENVIRONMENT
FEEDBACK
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made by persons or groups in the society that cannot all be fully satisfied.” The 
demand of a political system may rise from internal and external forces. External 
force means that the international environment encourages the domestic actors in a 
nation to react, while internal force means the political relationships of the members 
themselves may change as a result of dissatisfaction stemming from these 
relationships. Suffice it to say, the demand as a major type of input of political 
systems constitutes a significant part of the material upon which the system operates.  
 
Inputs of demands alone are not enough to keep a political system operating. 
The input of demand should be matched with support in the system so that the 
demands could be satisfied or conflicts in goals composed. The support of one party 
to another party means that A acts on behalf of or when it orients itself favorably 
toward B’s goals, interests and actions. It may consist of actions promoting the goals, 
interests, and actions of another person. Support of a political system should be 
taking place in the three areas: which are the political community, the regime and the 
government (Easton, 1957, 400).  
 
The meaning of supporting and non-supporting of political community turned 
on whether there was sufficient mutual identification among the members of the 
system for them to be able to work together as a political community. Thus in any 
political system, the degree of being one group feeling and to the extent that the 
members of the system identify one another as a part of this unit such as territoriality, 
kinship, or citizenship, we would say that they are putting in support for the political 
community. 
 
Political regime relates to some rules, norms, principles, arrangements and 
institutions that govern the rules of the game. However, since the concept of political 
regime is still quite large, it is difficult to identify what are the most important sets of 
arrangements and institutions and, most importantly, how the changes in these sets 
contributed to the “regime change” of the research focus.  
 
Regarding the government, if a political system is going to be able to handle the 
conflicting demands put into it, not only must the members of the system be prepared 
to support the settlement of these conflicts in common and possess some consensus 
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with regard to the rules governing the mode of settlement; they must also be ready to 
support a government as it undertakes the concrete tasks involved in negotiating such 
settlements; they must also be ready to support a government as it undertakes the 
concrete task involved in negotiating such settlements (Easton, 1957, p.396).  
 
 
4. The literature review on the importance of regimes in political science  
 
As we have mentioned beforehand, regime can be divided into two levels of 
analysis – the international level and the national level.  
 
It should be noted that the definitions of “regime” in the literature have been 
quite ambiguous and most of them have just defined as a set of rules, norms and 
principles, arrangements and institutional matters that governed the society and 
contributed to the overall harmony and cooperation of the socio-political economy. 
Puchala and Hopkins (1983, p.256) stated that a regime is an attitudinal phenomenon. 
Behaviour follows from adherence to principles, norms, and rules, which legal codes 
sometime reflect. But regimes themselves are subjective: they exist primarily as 
participants’ understandings, expectations or convictions about legitimate, 
appropriate or moral behaviour. Keohane and Kye (1977, p.19) defined regimes as “a 
set of governing arrangements” and include “networks of rules, norms, and 
procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects”.  Haas argues that a 
regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules and norms (Ernst, 
1980, p.403).  Krasner (1983, p.112) also defined a regime as “implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations coverage in a given area of the society” and stated that a fundamental 
distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, the rules 
and procedures on the other. Principles and norms provide the basic defining 
characteristics of a regime. There may be many rules and decision-making 
procedures that are consistent with the sample principles and norms. Principles are 
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice. This usage is consistent with other recent 
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formulations.  
 
In fact, it must be understood that regimes are not short-term or temporary 
arrangements that will be easy to change with every shift in power of interests. 
Keohane points out that a basic analytic distinction must be made between regimes 
and agreements. Agreements are ad hoc, often “one-shot”, arrangements. The 
purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. Jervis (1982, p.371) argued that the 
concept of regimes imply not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, 
but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest. 
Similarly, regime-governed behaviour must not be based solely on short-term 
calculations of interest. Since regimes encompass principles and norms, the utility 
function that is being maximized must embody some sense of general obligation. 
 
At the international level, it is noted that the importance of international regime 
in explaining the state behaviour has arrested attention starting from the 1970s. 
Young (1980, p.331) stated that “rising interest in the concept of international regime 
in the 1970s is much like that accorded to international system in the 1950s”. As 
Haggard and Simmons (1987, p. 498) argued, “over the last ten years, international 
regimes emerged as a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within 
international relations”. It has become intellectually fashionable to speak and write 
about regimes. Some authors have identified international political and economic 
conditions that may affect political regimes, including colonial legacies (Collier, 
1982), and economic dependence (Bollen, 1983). The earlier interpretation on the 
meaning of “international regime” could be found from the article written by both 
Young (1980, p.346) and Ernst (1980, p.553), in which they defined “regime” as a 
“norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area”. Puchala 
and Hopkins (1983, p.61) argued that “a regime exists in very substantive issue-area 
in international relations, wherever there is regularity in behaviour, some kinds of 
principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it”, and regimes constrain and 
regularize the behaviour of participants, affect which activities are legitimized or 
condemned, and influence whether, when, and how conflicts are resolved. 
  
At the national level, Easton (1957, p. 383) argued that regime served to channel 
political action within a system and give it meaning. A description of a regime must 
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include a characterization of the major principles it upholds and each regime has a 
set of elites who are the practical actors within it, for instance, the government of 
nation-states are the prime official members. More concretely, regime participants 
are most often bureaucratic units or individuals who operate as parts of the 
“government” by creating, enforcing or otherwise acting in compliance with norms. 
Fishman (1990, p.41) stated that “a regime may be thought of as the formal and 
informal organization of the centre of political power, and of its relations with the 
broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how 
those who are in power deal with those who are not”. His definition has implications 
for the issue of regime type, which involves making distinctions among concepts 
such as democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism. Actually, authors have used 
the term of “regime” to describe the particular constitutional system of a government 
(O’Donnell, 1973; 1978; 1988) and many countries have been regarded as 
undergoing a kind of regime change, for instance Turkey, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka 
changed from democratic to semi-democratic regimes. O’Donnell (1973, p.6) stated 
that the political regime will change due to the socioeconomic conditions; other 
authors, for example Vanhanen (1990, p.193), argued that besides socioeconomic 
conditions social-structural conditions such as societal homogeneity, low or moderate 
inequality, a relatively even distribution of power among societal groups are factors 
that contributed to the changes and towards democracy (a regime type).  It is noted 
that since Japan had already been changed to a democracy after 1945, it has not 
undergone such a kind of regime change during the period under study here and 
thereby Japan cannot be regarded as a regime change in the way we apply this 
definition into our study. There are many subtypes in the democratic system, as 
argued by Huntington (1968, p. 298), the character of political institutions also affect 
political regime, for instance, under democratic regimes, institutional features that 
promote stability and compromise are widely important to facilitate the persistence 
of democracy.  
 
At the national level, regime can be divided into different domains. For the 
regime related to constitutional order, most typical regime change is from the 
authoritarian domain to the democracy domain; the typical domains for which regime 
is related to the relationship between political and economic sectors are from 
corporatism to non-corporatism, or from mercantilism to liberalism. Last but not 
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least, for the regime that relates to the party system, which will be used in this 
current research, the focus on the national level will be from single party dominance 
to coalitional government. 
 
 
5. The literature review on regime change in political science 
 
Moving now to the literature on regime change, Krasner (1983, p. 318) pointed 
out changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes 
provided that principles and norms are unaltered. He cited an example regarding the 
increase of private bank financing in United States during the 1970s but this only 
showed a change in the rules but it did not mean that there has been a fundamental 
change in the regime. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime 
itself. However, whether the changes are in rules and decision-making procedures or 
in principles and norms as well is difficult to define and can be subject to subjective 
interpretations. Such assessments are never easy because they cannot be based on 
objective behavioral observations. And Krasner (1983, p.330) stated that finally if the 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less 
coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, 
rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened. In sum, change within a regime 
involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or 
principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles; and 
weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or 
inconsistency between the regime and related behaviour.   
 
Other scholars have also written on the concept of “regime change”. Puchala 
and Hopkins (1983, p. 125) stated that regimes change substantively in at least two 
different ways: one preserve norms while changing principles; the other overturns 
norms in order to change principles. Regimes may change qualitatively because 
those who participate in them change their minds about interests and aims. They 
called it as evolutionary change, because it occurs within the procedural norms of the 
regime, usually without major changes in the distribution of power among 
participants. Such change, undisturbing to the power structure and within the 
regime’s “rules of the game”, is rather conceptual and characteristic mainly of 
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functionally-specific regimes.  By contrast, revolutionary change is more common. 
Most regimes function to the advantage of some participants and to the disadvantage 
of others. The disadvantaged accept regime principles and norms because the costs of 
noncompliance are understood to be higher than the costs of compliance. The 
evolutionary and revolutionary regime change provides insight on the possible 
explanations of regime change in Japan. 
 
Besides, theoretical approaches to regime change and variance were also 
explained. Haggard and Simmons (1987, p. 492) stated that the regime development 
and change can be grouped into four categories: structural, game-theoretic, function 
and cognitive. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and the most persuasive 
interpretations are likely to draw from more than one theoretical tradition. In fact, 
most of the structural, game-theoretic and functional theories of regimes are 
state-centered, presuming unified rational actors, even if the assumption is related to 
gain explanatory leverage (Keohane, 1984, p.97). The structural explanations 
represented by hegemonic stability theory, it showed that how international 
conditions define the possibilities for cooperation. Structuralists argue that we cannot 
infer national policies from intentions because structures tend to “persuade” state 
behaviour toward a common quality of outcomes even though the efforts and aims of 
agents and agencies vary (Keohane, 1984; Waltz, 1979). Haggard and Simmons 
(1987, p.503) stated that the theory of hegemonic stability offers the most 
parsimonious and widely employed explanation of regime dynamics; it links regime 
creation and maintenance to a dominant power’s existence and the weakening of 
regimes to waning hegemony.  
 
This part has revealed the definition of political regime, what contributes to the 
regime changes, the types of regime change and theories in explaining regime change. 
In fact, it should be noted for the purposes of this study that the definition of regimes 
would based on the general definition that regime is a sets of rules, decision-making 
procedures, principles, and norms. However, as the literature showed, changes in 
rules and decision-making do not result in a regime change but only result in a 
change within a regime, whereas the changes in principles and norms do contribute 
to a change of a regime. Therefore, the literature review provides insights into the 
basis for judging whether Japan has changed in terms of its rules and 
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decision-making procedures or norms and principles. 
 
The definition of political regime has been revealed from the literature, but, still, 
it is rather difficult to distinguish three parts: (1) How to assess whether the changes 
are “rules and decision-making procedures” and “principles and norms”? (2) Will the 
changes in “rules and decision-making procedures” result in the changes of 
“principles and norms”? (3) What are the institutional arrangements that relate rules, 
decision-making procedures, principles and norms? Specifically, what are the 
elements, arrangements and institutional settings of a regime? The previous literature 
reviews are not able to provide all the answers on specifying some core elements of a 
regime; however, they are obviously essential in the current study. 
 
Pempel (1992; 1997) has given insights on the core elements within a regime 
and has provided some discussion on regime and the Japanese political economy. As 
one of the few scholars to apply the concept of “regime” to the Japanese case, 
moreover, the ideas of Pempel can provide insight for the theoretical development of 
the current study. He stated that regime involves a sustained fusion between the 
institutions of the state and particular segments of the socio-economic order.  
Moreover, the regime is the expectation that specific components of state and 
societal power will be mutually reinforcing and that public actions will reflect the 
character of this interaction. In short, a regime’s character will be determined by the 
societal coalition on which a state rests, the formal powers of that state, and by the 
institutionalization and bias of the public policies that result.  
 
More specifically, the core domains constitute a domestic regime. The major 
elements constituting a regime according to Pempel, are 1) the character of the 
socio-economic coalition that rules the country; 2) the political and economic 
institutions through which power is acquired and exercised; and 3) the public policy 
profile that gives broad political direction to the nation. Each has its own analytic 
autonomy, yet at the same time, all three interact with one another in reinforcing and 
overlapping ways. In combination, they constitute Japan’s political economic 
“regime”. The consequence of change is almost certain to be the creation of a new 
regime that will be based on revised socio-economic coalitional arrangements, 
modified political institutions, and uncharted directions for public policy.  
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 He further analyzed the concept of “regime”. He stated that a regime involves a 
sustained fusion among three things: political institutions, particular segments of the 
socio-economic order, and a specific mixture of public policies. Within democracies, 
the character of this fusion – that is, the nature of a regime – is mediated in important 
ways by a regularized pattern of political and economic interactions that are 
synergistic in character: all three traits of a regime feed into and reinforce one 
another. In this sense, regime equates with a particular social order.  
 
 Pempel (1998) in his book defines clearly the nature of regime and the core 
elements of a regime which are essentially important in drawing up the theoretical 
framework. The term “regime” refers to a middle level of cohesion in the political 
economy of a nation-state. A regime is far less sweeping and comprehensive than a 
“political system” (which has been explained in previous section), “constitutional 
order” or “economic system”. At the same time, the character of a regime usually 
transcends several specific administrations, presidencies, cabinets, and is more 
comprehensive than any time-bound economic direction such as deficit-finance, 
balanced budgets or loose money, and a regime is composed of three essential 
elements: political institutions, public policy paradigm and socioeconomic coalitions. 
These three overlap and reinforce one another; they resemble the three legs of a 
tripod that may collapse when any one is removed. They interact in complex ways, 
developing and responding to a discrete internal logic.  
 
 A stable regime consists of mutually reinforcing relationships among three sets 
of variables: the major political institutions, public policy and the socioeconomic 
coalitions. More tangibly, such regimes are characterized by the broadly consistent 
direction in which the country proceeds (its public policy), by the groups that 
empower – and are empowered by – this movement (its socioeconomic alliances), 
and by the regularized organizations of decision-making through which it channels 
and manifests such power (its political and economic institutions). All three 
components are constantly reinforcing and sustaining one another through “virtuous 
circles” or “positive synergies”. Predictability becomes more problematic and 
equilibrium is undermined in the forces of regime change. Such a spiral must be 
corrected by internal adjustments; if the action and responses are not able to tackle 
the internal adjustments, the regime will eventually collapse, and a new differently 
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ordered regime may emerge.  
 
The concept of “regime change” is a good model to apply in the study of post- 
1980s Japanese politics, which has been a transitional period. The regime change 
model helps to outline the main pillars for the analysis and enables us to compare the 
extent of whatever changes have occurred between the two different regimes. 
 
 
6. Main Theoretical Framework of Thesis 
 
 The current research would like to focus on whether Japan has undergone a 
regime change in the 1990s. Drawing from the insights of the literature review, the 
conceptual flow of the regime model could be defined in the following aspects: 
a. Regime is different from political system (Easton, 1957, p.389) 
b. Regime is a set of rules, decision-making procedures, norms, principles and the 
so-called rules of the game 
c. Regime also refer to all the arrangements and institutions that regulate the way 
in which the demands put into the system are settled and the way in which 
decisions are put into effect. 
d. Regime includes primarily political institutions, public policy paradigm and 
socioeconomic coalitions. The change in these aspects of a nation means the 
change in regime in that nation. 
e. The core elements of regime interact in complex ways, developing and 
responding with each other, thus forming a mutually reinforcing relationship. 
The change in socio-economic coalition will lead to the change of political 
institutions and public policy, and the other way round is also true. 
f. The regime change of a nation does not happen in a vacuum, the external 
environment / international environment would create impacts on the change of 
a regime, and will create change in the core element of a regime, which would 
trigger the change of another core element.  
 
 
 In the research, regime is defined as the whole system of political institutions/ 
organisations, socio-economic coalitions and the structure-supporting elements, 
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whose power has secured extensive obedience, stable and successive control in a 
society. This indicates that regime has, on one hand, a static, institutionalized 
character, and on the other, it involves a kinetic phase. In other words, when a regime 
as a system of the elements is formed, an interaction among the elements comes into 
existence, which induces a change in the formula of the system, which can in turn 
cause regime change. If the regime changed, it would be conceivable that the 
behavioral pattern of the actors, including that of a state, will undergo change. And a 
change of the regime has an influence upon the life of millions of people, creating a 
spectrum of feelings from terror to hope and creating new rules of the game.  
 
 This study focuses on ‘the process of change’ and ‘the structure supporting the 
process of regime change’ in Japan. Needless to say, we should undertake 
comparative efforts to make the definition of regime and regime change more 
meaningful. The research on the regime change of Japan in this thesis can be one of 
the significant positive cases in the development of the literature in this field. 
 
Please refer to Figure 2 for the theoretical framework of a regime change. 
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Figure 2: A theoretical framework of a regime change 
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 Figure 2 is the theoretical framework which I have drawn from the literature 
review of the concept of regime and how it could be used to examine the possible 
regime change in my research studies. In the theoretical model, it is assumed that the 
changes in the three main pillars will result in changes of the nation into a new 
regime. Furthermore, all three pillars are interlocking with each other and thereby 
one change will lead to change of another. Without the changes in all three pillars, 
there will not be a new regime formation. In the following chapters, the detailed 
changes in each pillar will be discussed, and the interrelations between them will be 
explained. 
 
In the research, although it is possible to identify the changes in the three pillars 
between the 1955-1993 period and the 1993-early 2000s period, it is a limitation 
that the analysis of the dynamic interactions between these three pillars cannot be 
covered to the same extent within this framework. Constraints of space and time 
also mean that a number of issues, such as why the first anti-LDP government 
emerged in 1993, why those former LDP ‘enemies’ were willing to ally with the 
LDP after 1994, and why the Murayama government failed to maintain its power in 
1996, cannot be covered in detail in this research. They will be good research 
questions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Political Institutions in Japan: Comparison between pre-1993 and post-1993 
periods 
 
 
Pempel (1997, p.347) argued that the Japanese political economy is indeed 
undergoing transformations. These are occurring at what might be thought of as a 
national level of politics and economics, one far deeper than the ever-recurring shifts 
in personalities and party strengths, but far less comprehensive than the kinds of 
totalistic shifts involved in a transition of authoritarianism to parliamentary 
democracy. The party system domain will be used to test out national level regime 
change.  
 
The year of 1993 was a critical year for the development of the political system 
in Japan since the political system of Japan underwent a great change in that year. 
From 1955 to 1993 was a LDP one party dominance regime with close connection 
with the American government in its foreign policy and heavy reliance on the close 
relationships with the agriculture sector, bureaucracy and the business sector in 
maintaining the stability of the government. The loss of the dominance rule of the 
LDP in 1993 in the HR election was a sudden change of its long-standing control of 
the political system. As discussed in chapter one, the theoretical framework 
suggested by Pempel (1997, 1998) has argued that a change in the political 
institutions was one of the factors contributing to the change of the regime of a 
nation. In this chapter, the extent of the changes of the political institutions of Japan 
will be discussed in detail with explanations on why such a change happened in 
1993. 
Political institutions – the typical subject of political science - are considered 
both in the sense of rules of the political game and as political organizations acting 
within that framework. Our main concerns in the research will be political parties, 
electoral rules, elections and parliaments, as well as the electoral, policy, coalition 
and strategic criteria used by political actors constrained by institutional rules. 
 
 19
 As Lindblom (1994, p. 58) has argued that in all the political systems of the 
world, much of politics is economics, and most of economics is politics. Clark (1998, 
p.9) too suggests that although the economy is usually viewed as an economic 
institution, it also performs important functions in achieving the political goal. In the 
case of Japan, we can find that the economic stagnation was one of the strong causes 
for regime change. Therefore, in the following research, the political economy, 
including political institutions and the economic situation, will also be covered. 
 
In the last decade, at least two essentials elements of the old regime have been 
that undergoing change. First, on the political level, the 38 years of dominance by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ended with the party’s internal fragmentation, its 
loss of a parliamentary majority and executive control, the eight-party coalition that 
made Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister since the party’s formation in 1955 and 
the introduction of a new electoral system for the HR of the Diet in 1994.  
 
Second, on the economic front, Japan’s seemingly endless string of 
achievements from the early 1950s until the end of the 1980s came to a halt as a 
result of the bursting of the economic “bubble” and the simultaneous collapse of 
stock, land prices and a number of substantial financial institutions. These 
represented a dramatic turnaround from the economic success that had previously 
happened in the national economy.  
 
Based on this background, the chapter will start by outlining the pre-1993 
political institutions by discussing the major political parties in Japan, particularly 
the nature and formation of the LDP. In explaining the LDP one-party dominance 
regime, the factionalism politics, the electoral system and why there was a monopoly 
by the LDP in elections for so long in Japan would also be examined. After 
discussing the pre-1993 political institutions in Japan, analysis will focus on the new 
regime from 1993 to the present, which began in 1993 with the splits in the LDP. It 
will be argued that the major change in political institutions in Japan was a change 
from LDP One-party dominance to a government of LDP-led coalitions. Events 
leading to why there was such a change will be discussed and the factors contributing 
to such a coalition rule will be raised. In describing the changes in the LDP one-party 
dominance regime in the post-1993 period, the Japan’s new electoral system, 
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including the rules that regulated the formation of smaller parties, issues related to 
dual candidates and identical ranking, restrictions on fundraising activities, and how 
the new electoral laws affected the factional politics in Japan. All these rules of the 
game changes contributed to a regime change in Japan. 
 
 
1. Political institutions in the pre-1993 period 
 
1.1 Major political parties in Japan 
The six major political parties in pre-1993 Japan were the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party 
(Minshato), the United Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu Rengo), the 
Komeito, the Japan Communist Party, while temporarily there existed the New 
Liberal Club (Shin Jiyu Kurabu), an offshoot of the LDP, rejoining the ruling party in 
year 1986 (Kishimoto, 1988, p97).  
 
The LDP is a confederation of conservative forces that functions essentially as a 
coalition of factions (which will be discussed later). It was the national-level ruling 
party of Japan throughout the entire the period between 1955 and 1993. Among the 
political systems of non-Socialist developed nations, Japan is unique in comparison 
with other western democratic countries, for except for a short period after World 
War II when a Socialist-centered coalition government ruled Japan in 1947-1948, 
conservative parties have dominated. After November 1955, when two conservative 
parties (Democratic and Liberal parties) merged to form the LDP, conservative rule 
was concentrated within that single organization and the LDP maintained its rule as 
the governing party for thirty-eight years (Hrebenar, 2000; Bouissou, 2002). Since 
1955, although it sometimes lost seats, the conservative LDP held a lion’s share of 
the seats in both the HC and the HR for 38 years. 
 
The left-and right-wing factions of Japan Socialist Party (JSP), were reunited in 
October 1955, the same year that the conservatives joined together as the LDP. It was 
the second largest party and the number one oppositional party in the pre-1993 Japan 
political system.  At the time of the two mergers the JSP was approximately half the 
size of the LDP and thoroughly dominated the opposition forces. However, a number 
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of reasons appeared from the 1960’s (including a rigid platform, internal disputes, 
and the emergence of competing opposition parties), which resulted in the gradual 
decline of the JSP (Kishimoto, 1998; Curtis, 1999; Hrebenar, 2000; Masumi, 1995; 
Bouissou, 2002). 
 
The Democratic Socialist Party, formed in January 1960, and the United Social 
Democratic Party, formed in March 1978, were both moderate progressive parties 
established by former right-wing JSP members who split away from the JSP 
(Kishimoto, 1998). The Komeito (also known as Clean Government Party) , formed 
in 1964 as the political arm of the Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist lay organization, is 
usually classified as a centrist party. Hrebenar (2000, p.191) claimed the Komeito’s 
policy positions were “humanitarian socialism and middle-of-the-road reformism”. 
Since the mid-1980s these three moderate opposition parties, along with the 
increasingly pragmatic JSP, have been cooperating in national elections (Kishimoto, 
1998; Masumi, 1995; Bouissou, 2002). 
 
The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was established in July 1922 but operated 
underground until it was legalized after WWII. It reorganized itself in 1958 on the 
principle of “self-reliance and independence”, with close interactions and 
connections with China and the Soviet Union. Its policy stances are for formulating a 
flexible, nonviolent platform and adopt a positive stance toward parliamentary 
government. However, due to its ideology of being communist-oriented, it was 
implicitly undermined by the United States government and it remained at odds with 
the other opposition parties, becoming increasingly isolated both at home and abroad. 
Therefore, in spite of being highly organized and reliably-financed, the party has not 
expanded since the mid-1970s (Kishimoto, 1998, p177).  
 
The New Liberal Club (NLC) was formed due to the LDP’s inadequate response 
to the side effects of rapid economic growth and to some major changes in the 
international environment, as well as disenchantment over the ethical problems 
raised by incidents like the Lockheed scandal. As a result, in June 1976, it was the 
first time for a group of dissidents to split off to form their own party outside the 
LDP. 
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The above six were the major political parties in Japan in the LDP dominance 
regime in the pre-1993 period. There are a number of reasons that contributed to the 
dominance of the LDP. Regarding the oppositional parties, besides the strong stance 
of the JSP, some new parties continued to form and hold anti-LDP feelings, but since 
there were too many personality clashes and conflicts within and between parties, it 
was difficult to form strong oppositional forces against LDP, for pre-1993 the 
concept of “form/ break-up reform” was limited – it applies much better to post-93 
period. No single party could threaten the LDP hegemonic dynasty. 
 
 
1.2 The nature and formation of LDP 
 
One scholar has written, “the dynamics and the logic of the political system 
would be different in the future from what they were during the period of 
so-called ’55 system, the long era of LDP dominance that began in 1955 when the 
conservative parties came together to form the LDP and the right and left wings of 
the socialists party united” (Curtis, 1999, p.45). The LDP’s record is certainly 
unprecedented among the ruling democratic parties in the world.  
 
The decision of the conservatives to merge was facilitated by two external 
forces. One of these was pressure from “corporate Japan” – what is called the 
financial world, or zaikai, including the Federation of Economic Organization 
(Keizai Dantai Rengokai), the Japan Federation of Employers’ Association (Nihon 
Keieisha Dantai Renmei), the Committee for Economic Development (Keizai 
Doyukai), and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoko 
Kaigisho). These four groups had called for the merging of the conservatives as early 
as 1952. This aspect also provided in the latter period for the formation of the 
so-called interdependent “iron-triangle” relationships. Historically, there have been 
extremely close ties between conservative parties and corporate Japan. This tight 
relationship of cooperative efforts between the government and the zaikai has been 
popularly known as “Japan Incorporated”. Businesses, banking and financial 
institutions are the top contributors to the LDP. Besides, real estate and construction 
industries were the second-largest donors of political funds. The great dependence on 
big business resulted in motivations for the zaikai to “force” them to articulate 
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clearly on the conflicts and rivalries (Hrebenar, 2000) and thus was instrumental in 
uniting various conservative elements into a single party (Jain, 1997, p. 251).  
 
The reasons why the business world, especially the banking community, has 
continued to support the LDP more than other parties lies in the fact that the LDP has 
helped to provide the most favourable environment for rapid economic expansion. 
Japanese postwar economic development has relied on the various levels of 
government and especially the private sector. To invest in modern equipment and 
factories, corporations had to borrow money from banks and other financial 
institutions. With these financial means available, Japanese industries have been able 
to scrap archaic facilities and build new and sophisticated plants, often equipped with 
the most modern robots. By means of such heavy borrowing, Japanese companies 
have been able to produce reliable products that have been very competitive in the 
international market.  
 
The second factor promoting the merger of the conservatives was the advance of 
the progressive political forces within Japan. The increasing dominant power of the 
opposition Right and Left Socialists in the lower house elections in the early 1950s 
posed a threat to conservative parties that if they were still divided into two parties, 
their position would be sooner or later overwhelmed by the socialist parties. In line 
with this argument, Bailey (1996, p.261) stated that the reuniting of the two wings of 
the Socialist Party in October 1955 pushed the two conservative parties to effect a 
similar arrangement, while Kishimoto (1988, p.179) argued that the common sense 
of urgency over the imminent reunification of the Japan Socialist Party and the 
enthusiasm for permanent conservative rule (LDP party president will become prime 
minister) were crucial.   
 
Burks (1991) has argued that this LDP can not be described either as liberal or 
democratic, nor even a party. As a conservative party, the LDP supports a free 
capitalist system as the foundation of democratic government and of economic and 
social activity. The LDP’s ideology and policies have also been seen as covering 
diverse opinion embraced by the party (factionalism), but by utilising the principles 
of nonconfrontation and compromise the LDP was able to retain cohesion and remain 
dominant. 
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2. LDP one-party dominance in the pre-1990s period 
 
2.1 Monopoly of LDP in elections 
In the LDP dominance regime, the monopoly of the LDP can be shown by the 
seats that the LDP held in the National Diet. The Diet and its operation have been 
fully stipulated in the Constitution made by the United States after the WWII. 
According to the Constitution, the Diet was Japan’s legislative organ, and according 
to the article 41 of the Constitution, it was the “sole law-making organ of the State” 
and “the highest organ of state power” (Kishimoto, 1988, p.50-51). The Diet 
comprised of the HR and the HC, both of which would consist of elected members, 
representatives of all the people.   
 
The number of Diet seats for the HR was 512 and 252 for the HC. The 
Constitution prohibits any person from holding a seat in both houses simultaneously. 
A full term for office for members of the HR is four years, but it will be cut short 
when the house is dissolved by Cabinet. The term of office for members of the House 
of Councillors is six years; a regular election for half the members is held every three 
years under a separate electoral system. 
 
According to the Constitution, the most important powers vested in the Diet are 
those of enacting laws, deciding on the budget, to approving treaties, to designating 
the prime minister and passing resolutions of confidence and non-confidence. Other 
important powers include the initiation of constitutional amendments. In a 
comparison of the two houses, the Constitution stipulated that the HR takes 
precedence over the HC.  
 
The prime minister is designated by each house separately in plenary session. 
Under Japan’s party system, the leader of the party with a majority in the Diet – or 
more precisely, in the HR – is designated prime minister. Therefore in order to 
analyze the monopoly of LDP from 1955 to 1993, it was possible to observe the 
number of seats in the HR that had been occupied by LDP in that period of time. 
Please see Table 1. 
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Table 1: Results of House of Representatives elections since the 1958 election (the 
major five political parties) 
 LDP JSP Komeito DSP JCP 
Year 1958 (Seats won) 287 166 N/A N/A 1 
Percent of Vote 57.8 32.9 N/A N/A 2.6 
Year 1960 (Seats won) 296 145 N/A 17 3 
Percent of Vote 57.6 27.6 N/A 8.8 2.9 
Year 1963 (Seats won) 283 144 N/A 23 5 
Percent of Vote 54.7 29 N/A 7.4 4.0 
Year 1967 (Seats won) 277 140 25 30 5 
Percent of Vote 48.8 27.9 5.4 7.4 4.8 
Year 1969 (Seats won) 277 140 25 30 5 
Percent of Vote 48.8 27.9 5.4 7.4 4.8 
Year 1972 (Seats won) 271 118 29 19 38 
Percent of Vote 46.9 21.9 8.5 7.0 10.5 
Year 1976 (Seats won) 249 118 29 19 38 
Percent of Vote 41.8 21.9 8.5 7.0 10.5 
Year 1979 (Seats won) 248 107 57 35 39 
Percent of Vote 44.6 19.7 9.8 6.8 10.4 
Year 1980 (Seats won) 284 107 33 32 29 
Percent of Vote 47.9 19.3 9.0 6.6 9.8 
Year 1983 (Seats won) 250 112 58 38 26 
Percent of Vote 45.8 19.5 10.1 7.3 9.3 
Year 1986 (Seats won) 300 85 56 26 26 
Percent of Vote 49.4 17.2 9.4 6.4 8.3 
Year 1990 (Seats won) 275 136 45 14 16 
Percent of Vote 46.1 24.4 8.0 4.8 8.0 
Year 1993 (Seats won) 223 70 51 15 15 
Percent of Vote 46.1 24.4 8.0 4.8 8.0 
SOURCE:  
1. Kishimoto, K. (1988). Politics in modern Japan: development and organization. Tokyo: Japan 
Echo Inc. 
2. Hrebenar, R. J. (1992). Japan’s party system. US: Westview Press. 
3. Rothacher, A. (1993). The Japanese power elite. US: St. Martin’s press Inc. 
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 The monopoly of the LDP can be found in its election results in the HR since 
almost half the seats in every election in the whole period were occupied by it and at 
the same time the party leader could become the prime minister.  Moreover, from 
the table, it is also possible to find out that there were not any one of the opposition 
parties was able on its own to exert any serious electoral threat to the LDP, for even 
Japan’s four former opposition parties – the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan 
Communist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the Komeito – were seen to 
flounder helplessly under the complete domination of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP).1 From its founding in 1955 until 1989, the LDP won every national 
election and selected every prime minister and cabinet member.  Other democracies 
have had similarly dominant parties, but none of them come close to the LDP in 
terms of its longevity in power and its complete dominance of the political scene. 
Therefore, in the pre-1993, it was the LDP one-party dominance regime in Japan. 
 
 
2.2 Reasons for the LDP dominance in the regime of pre-1990s 
 
2.2.1 Electoral system in Japan 
Some scholars have argued that the long dominance of the LDP reflected a 
strong relationship with the nature of the nation’s electoral laws and its political party 
system. The results of one-party dominance regime are not only based on cultural 
and historical factors but also on election systems that are conducive to the evolution 
of the one-party system, in which the LDP was holding power.  
 
Herbenar (2000, p. 152) stated that the pre-1993 one- party dominance regime 
was characterized by an election law based on multi-member parliamentary districts, 
chronic mal-apportionment, and a straitjacket campaign activities restriction law. The 
net effect of these laws operated to keep Japan in a one-party-dominant position. The 
electoral law had been one of the crucial factors contributing to the success of the 
LDP. The two most distinguishing characteristics of the old Japanese election system 
in the LDP dominance regime were “multi-member districts with single 
non-transferable voting (SNTV) and unequal apportionment” (Wada, 1996, p.3). 
                                                 
1 These parties are called the “former” opposition parties because in 1993 three of them lost their 
opposition status when they became part of a coalition government. 
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Curtis (1999, p.140) stated that “this terminology emphasized the nature of the ballot 
on which to write the name of his or her preferred candidate. The vote is single entry 
in that the voter can cast a ballot for only one candidate, even though several are 
elected to the Diet in the district. It is nontransferable in that there is no formula for 
transferring votes that are cast for candidate to another”.  
 
It was also commonly called the medium-sized-district (MSD) electoral system 
(in contrast to fewer candidates elected in each district than under the 
prefecture-wide “large-size-election-district system” from 1900 to 1920, and more 
than the “small-size-election-district system” used for two elections in the early 
1920s). Thus in MSD systems, the proportion of the vote that one needs to win a seat 
is not fixed, but varies with the competitive situation in the constituency, and thus 
varies from constituency to constituency.  
 
Under the electoral system that was used until 1993 the 511 members of the HR 
were elected from 129 constituencies. The district magnitude ranged from two to six, 
with most districts having between three to five seats. Voters cast a single ballot 
regardless of the number of seats in their district. The ballots were counted in each 
district. For instance, in a district with four seats, the top four vote-getters would be 
elected as Diet members (Abe, 1990). This kind of combination of multimember 
districts and single-entry ballots means that any party seeking a Diet majority (256 
seats in a 511 member in HR) had to run multiple candidates for the same party to 
target their campaigns at voters who supported their party rather than voters who did 
not. For example, Hrebenar (2000) stated that the relationship between constituency 
magnitude and LDP success was also clear in the 1990 General Election (HR). From 
the election result, we can find that the fewer seats elected in a district, the better 
success rate the LDP achieved. The LDP won the seat in the single-seat district; 
62.5% of the seats in the 2-seat districts; 57.9% in the 3-seat districts; 53.5% in the 
4-seat district; 52.6% in the 5-seat district and 33.3% in the 6-seat district. As the 
largest party in Japan, the LDP got crucial advantage in the election system in the 
LDP one-party dominance regime. 
 
On the other hand, this had in fact created great competition among LDP 
candidates (Curtis, 1999, p.87). There was intra-party competition among LDP 
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candidates because the party itself did not control the campaigns of its candidates. 
Relations between candidates and the party organization were rather like a franchise 
system. Perhaps, another important factor that contributed to the success of the LDP 
in the election system in the one party dominance regime was its strength in raising 
funds from big business for its candidates. Multi-member districts with SNTV are 
used in every level of elections in Japan, which are sometimes called “elections 
Japanese style” and have often been considered as a “bad system”. 2  The 
combination of multi-member districts with SNTV forces LDP politicians to compete 
against each other in the same district. Since they must espouse the same party’s 
policy, ideological differences become irrelevant and they are led into pork-barrel 
politics, which means government spending that is intended to benefit constituents of 
a politician in return for their political support, either in the form of campaign 
contributions or votes. Typically it involves funding for government programs whose 
economic or service benefits are concentrated in a particular area but whose costs are 
spread among all taxpayers. Public works projects and agricultural subsidies are the 
most commonly cited examples. Moreover, in the election they argue they need more 
money to compete with each other. This is typical politicians’ logic to explain that 
Japanese “money politics” is not their own invention. Many journalists and political 
scientists, including Ishikawa (1981, 1984, 1990), Sakagami (1990), and Iwai (1991) 
have also accepted this logic. 
 
Sims (2001, p. 323) argued that LDP, either as a party or through its factions and 
Diet members, acquired enormous funds – far beyond the amounts which rival 
parties could raise. It is believed that the funds from all sectors of businesses could 
be originated from the personnel networks of particularly factions leaders (depending 
on the relatively strength of the factions and their influential power in LDP). These 
funds generally increased as Japan grew richer and government expenditure 
accelerated. Hrebenar (1992, p.6) and Pempel (1998, p.184) stated that in the 1980s 
between 40 million yen (for a well-established Diet number) and 200 million yen (for 
a newcomer) was needed to ensure election to the House of Representatives; and that 
by 1992 a LDP Diet member would require 140 million yen for routine activities in a 
non-election year. Therefore, the LDP’s strength in raising funds from big business 
                                                 
2 Ray Christensen, Ending the LDP Hegemony- Party Cooperation in Japan, Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i, 2000 
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sectors for its party is one of the decisive elements in the game of election. 
 
 
2.3 Factional politics in LDP 
Wada (1996, p.75) stated that the electoral rules explain some important features 
of Japanese political economy, including LDP’s factional politics and the stable LDP 
government. 
 
One of the key characteristics of the LDP’s part system has been factionalism 
(Hrebenar, 2000; Bruks, 1991; Curtis, 1999; Rothacher, 1993; Reed, 2003, 
Richardson, 1997; Hane, 1996; Koichi 1988; Masumi, 1995; Wada, 1996, Sims 2001; 
Allinson, 1997; Thayer, 1969; Baerwald; 1986). 
 
Hrebenar (2000, p.106) stated that “it is impossible to discuss the LDP and its 
dynamics without a thorough examination of its factional nature.” In fact, the LDP is 
an alliance of factions in which the greater part of the party’s affairs were conducted 
by the factions. Most importantly, the factions play a crucial role in the resolution of 
party personnel matters: the selection of the party president (who also usually serves 
as the nation’s prime minister), the appointment of cabinet ministers, and the naming 
of important party officials. The party offered a known name, financial support, and 
other assistance to its endorsed candidates, but each candidate was in effect an 
independent political entrepreneur with his own local organization and his marketing 
strategies.  
 
There were several major factions with the LDP by the early 1990s. The largest 
and most powerful in the early 1990s was the Obuchi faction. Originally led by 
Tanaka Kakuei, who  was arrested in 1976 on suspicion of having accepted bribes 
from the Lockheed Corporation, the faction was then led by Takeshita Noboru who 
later became the prime minister of the country after Nakasone Yasuhiro(Kishimoto, 
1988, p. 223), before handling over Obuchi Keizo.  
 
Another important group within the LDP is the Kato, or former Miyazawa 
faction. This group, led by Miyazawa Kiichi for much of the past several decades, 
was an heir to the faction led by Ikeda Hayato, who directed Japan’s period of high 
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growth during the 1960s. After Ikeda’s death, the faction was temporarily taken over 
by Maeo Shigesaburo and then by Ohira Masayoshi. After Ohira’s death, Suzuki 
Zenko had taken over the faction but decided to step down from the premiership in 
1982 to Nakasone. Subsequently in 1987 he finally transferred his factional 
leadership to Miyazawa, who then passed it on to Kato Koichi in 1998 (Kishimoto, 
1988, p177). 
 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, who became the prime minister from 1982 to 1987, led his 
own faction, which had about 67 members, but since his faction was so small in size 
he was unable to run either the party or the affairs of government by himself. He 
simply never could have become party president of head of the government without 
the support of the Tanaka and Suzuki factions. In effect, the two supporting factions 
had a near-veto power over policies advocated by Nakasone. It was strongly 
criticized it as the “Tanaka-Sone Government” (Kishimoto, 1988, p.165), which 
exerted sweeping influence in the political system in the pre-1990s period.  
 
Rothacher (1993, p.378) argued that the upkeep of a faction is a costly enterprise. 
A faction leader is expected to contribute a large amount of money to his MPs’ 
election campaigns and to the maintenance of their secretariat and constituency 
support organizations (koenkai). The strength of a faction is determined by (a) the 
number of faction members returned in an election (which may in turn depend on the 
faction’s campaign budget, (b) the successful election of newcomers endorsed by the 
party and financed by the faction, (c) the recruitment of independent MPs and (d) the 
poaching of MPs from other factions.  
 
In face of the factional nature of the LDP, the abilities of individuals, no matter 
how capable, have little if any influence over whether they will receive key political 
positions. To this degree, the factions of the LDP form a “system” within the LDP 
politics and each faction maintains its own offices and hold meetings at regular 
intervals. Thereby, these factions are, in essence, parties within a party, and hence the 
LDP must be viewed as composed of several parties. As different with other 
opposition parties, factionalism allows the LDP politicians to have wide range of 
flexibility to serve different groups without the strong barriers of political ideology. 
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Kishimoto (1988, p.143) stated that, originally party factions were groupings of 
Diet members of similar background bound by the ties of obligation and debt that 
have long played an important role in Japanese political custom. The LDP factions 
were massive profit-making organizations that dominated not only the election of 
party presidents but also the president-cum-prime minister’s appointment of cabinet 
ministers and party officials. They could affect even the outcome of national 
elections through their influence over the recognition of official candidates and 
through the allocation of campaign funds and other assistance.  
 
Different faction leaders received funds from large businesses in order to 
support their campaigns. Each faction leader has very close links with different 
bankers and business leaders in order to strengthen their fund-raising ability; 
therefore very close cohesion was formed among the business sector and political 
party of the “Iron triangle”. This is where the electoral system discussed in the 
previous section came into play. It was of the interests of each faction within the LDP 
to strive to gain more support for their own candidates instead of for the party as a 
whole.  
 
Jain (1997, p.17) stated that the LDP has been a truly “grand coalition” and 
“department store”, which could represent a large spectrum of interests of the 
Japanese society (Okimoto, 1988). Therefore, the LDP captured wide range of 
support by different factions. Internally, factionalism also acted for the restricted use 
of power was also a consequence of its own division (this will be discussed in more 
detail in later part). Simply speaking, even though the LDP was dominant in the 
political system, it involved different factions that barred it from uniting towards a 
common aim and goal, except the common interest of being one united party 
(Hrebenar, 2000; Curtis, 1999; Reed, 2003). Therefore, any attempt to achieve a 
significant change of policy might end up in factional opposition with the LDP. This 
helped prevent the internal disaffection (Jain, 1997, p.69) and maintain the stability 
of the LDP government in Japan for 38 years long. 
 
 
2.4 Other reasons for LDP dominance  
Besides the monopoly in the election system, Sims (2001, p. 342) also stated 
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that “the main cause of the high economic growth rates which marked the 1950s 
and ’60s, and to a lesser extent the 1970s and 1980s was effective planning and 
guidance by Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)… … and the LDP 
was able, at the least, to claim credit for providing stability and not restricting 
economic vitality”. This helped the LDP’s success in winning more support than any 
of the opposition parties in every age-group, and at all educational and occupational 
levels (Editorial comment in Japan Echo, 1978). The sound economic performance in 
Japan after postwar recovery till the 1990s reflected that the government and the 
LDP were relatively stable and competent in comparison with the “united” or 
“unproven” opposition parties. 
 
Another reason was the strong support for the party by a number of highly 
influential interest groups, especially the powerful agricultural sector and the 
majority of urban and semi-urban middle class voters developing since the nation’s 
rapid economic growth and raising affluence. The agricultural cooperatives were the 
pillar of the LDP’s hegemony. Bouissou (2002, p.152) argued that “the cooperatives 
were essential to control the rural constituencies, which were the LDP’s stronghold. 
They could get entire hamlets out to vote, not losing more than a few votes”. The role 
of the agricultural cooperatives is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.  
 
In addition, it can be argued that, paradoxically, another internal factor was the 
LDP’s restraint in using its power excessively during the stage of dominance. 
Because of a traditional preference for consensus and a powerful common goal 
because of fear of a return to authoritarianism and aims to strive for economic 
prosperity after war, Japanese people in the post-war decades were uneasy about the 
government pushing through legislation against the strong opposition of the other 
parties. Therefore, rather than present its opponents with the opportunity to invoke 
arguments, the LDP often preferred to make a compromise.  Consequently, “No 
fewer than 23 percent of the bills which it (the LDP) submitted to the Diet between 
1950 and 1990 were withdrawn or postponed because of opposition, while 15 percent 
were amended” (Sims, 2001, p.338).  
 
In line with the above underlying reasons, the long-lasting dominance of the 
LDP would result in poor results for the opposition parties, thus preventing them 
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from demonstrating that they were capable of governing the country. Intuitively, in 
spite of the sometimes only average performance of the LDP, the Japanese did not 
have confidence that the opposition party could perform better than the LDP and 
therefore the opposition party could not put their doctrine and ideology into practice. 
This situation became more serious and commonplace once the LDP had held power 
over a number of years (Sims, 2001, p.205). Besides the lack of experience in 
administration, another point was that the opposition parties seemed to be too weak 
against the LDP. Part of the reason was the opposition parties were also limited by 
the fact that they were perceived as representing particular interests. Sims (2001, 
p.340) argued that “to a lesser extent that Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was 
tarnished by its close association – reflected in its choice of candidates – with the 
public-service unions, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) by its links with 
private-sector unions”. The socialists also criticized the LDP as “monopoly 
capitalism” and occasionally fought for better wages for workers, but the JSP had 
never provided and economic blueprint for the nation (Jain, 1997, p.65). Moreover, 
the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was founded on Marxist ideology and this 
created an adverse image amongst the Japanese, especially as the Japanese 
government wanted to keep good relations with the democratic United State. Other 
opposition parties were similarly either poorly organized or narrowly focused and 
therefore contributing to the prolonged rule of the LDP. 
 
Last but not least, a more crucial factor was driven by the Cold War ideological 
differences between the US bloc and the Soviet bloc, representing capitalism and 
communism. The United States found that Japan was an important strategic ally and 
Japan found that the United States was an important protector in the postwar 
economic recovery. It was easy to understand that the United States would like to 
support a pro-US LDP and oppose a pro-Soviet JSP (Jain, 1997, p.231). 
 
In the pre-1993 period which had been dominated by the LDP, there had been a 
number of opposition parties but the situations were that none of them could exert a 
threat to the LDP’s position for various reasons. Within the structure of the LDP, it 
could be discussed in terms of factionalism, acting like a coalition government, but 
all the factions were quite restricted from separating since this would undermine their 
powers and interests. The electoral system was also designed in creating the 
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factionalism as well as the dominance of the LDP in that period of time. In relation to 
the political system of Japan, the so-called “Iron Triangle” or elite model were also 
discussed. The interrelationship of the three angles have been regarded as a unique 
feature of Japanese politics and its strong economic growth in the LDP dominance 
regime, but nevertheless also became associated with “money politics” which 
resulted in scandals.   
 
In closing, this section has mainly employed a descriptive approach on the 
political system of Japan in the pre-1993 period in which LDP had been dominant. 
There had been a number of opposition parties but none of them could exert serious 
threat to the LDP’s position for various reasons. However, this situation was to 
change in 1993. 
 
 
3. Japan’s political institutions in the post-1993 period 
 
Japan’s political institution in the post 1993 period up to the year of 2004 can be 
called Single Party rule to LDP-led coalition. 
 
3.1 One Party rule to LDP-led coalition 
The key difference between the pre- and post- 1993 regime is the shift from LDP 
one-party rule to LDP-led coalition. From August 1993 to April 1994, eight parties 
joined together to form the first non- LDP government in 38 years and promised to 
“break the collusive relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and business 
(Nakano, 1998, p.291). This started the prologue of chaotic regime change from LDP 
dominance regime (1955-1993) to the first non-LDP Hosokawa, Hato and Murayama 
governments (1993 – 1996) and finally to LDP-led coalition regime. 
 
In June 1993, the HR passed a no-confidence resolution against the LDP 
government headed by Miyazawa Kiichi, effectively putting an end to the LDP’s 
long reign which was subsequently sealed by the July general election (Shinoda, 
1998, p.41). The prime minister who emerged at that time was the Hosokawa 
Morihiro of the Japan New Party (JNP). He had to lead an unprecedented coalition of 
eight political groups with a wide range of conflicting political agendas. 
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Mulgan (2003, p.175) argues that coalitions are a product of the need for working 
majorities in parliamentary Cabinet systems. Parties do not normally enter into a 
coalition if they can avoid it. But the starting in June 1994, even the LDP was only 
able to resume power by entering into a formal coalition agreement with two 
defectors from the anti-LDP coalition – the Socialist Party (JSP / SDPJ) and 
Sakigake. This new three-way coalition government lasted until the HR elections of 
October 1996, when a general election was held to choose a new 500-member HR. 
This was the first contest held under a sweeping electoral reform passed in 1994. 
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro's LDP made significant gains with 239 seats, but 
fell short by 12 seats of a majority needed to rule on its own.  
 
As a result, Hashimoto sought to renew the previous three party-coalition 
(January 1996 to then) that he headed; however, his two coalition partners--the 
Social Democratic Party (SDPJ) and a tiny splinter group called Sakigake 
party--refused his overture, fearing that they would become irrelevant parties in an 
LDP-dominated coalition. Instead, the three parties agreed to form a loose alliance 
and cooperate outside the cabinet through frequent policy consultation. The SDPJ 
and the Sakigake party were excluded from Hashimoto’s minority cabine. The 
shortfall in seats saw the LDP continuing a parliamentary alliance with Socialists and 
Sakigake until September 1997, by which time it had attracted a sufficient number of 
HR members back into its ranks to regain a majority. 
 
In spite of the restoration of its majority-party status, the LDP continued its 
cooperative relationship with the SDPJ and Sakigake outside the Cabinet until April 
1998 when the Socialists and Sakigake pulled out of the alliance in order to 
underscore their identities as separate parties in the lead-up to the July 1998 HC 
election. 
 
The LDP’s propensity for forming quasi-coalitions during this period was 
influenced to some extent by its weakened position in the HC. Despite the LDP’s 
majority in the HR, the number of seats it held in the HC fell to such a low level that 
it again pursed the coalition option, this time with the Liberal Party (LP), which was 
brought into the Cabinet in January 1999 (a combination that still fell short of a 
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majority of seats in the HC), followed by the “New Komeito”, which was formally 
incorporated into the coalition in October that year. In April 2000, the LDP and 
Komeito ended their coalition with the Liberal Party, but invited back into the 
coalition a group of defectors from the Liberal Party who had formed the 
Conservative Party (Hoshuto).  
 
The results of the 2000 HR election have only served to entrench coalition 
politics further. The three ruling parties presented voters with a solid coalition front, 
with a clear choice between the tripartite alliance and a number of separate 
opposition parties. In June 2000, the ruling coalition of the LDP, New Komeito and 
New Conservative Party (NCP) won a comfortable majority. The ruling coalition, 
with a total of 271 seats, enjoyed the so-called perfect working majority in the HR. It 
commanded an absolute majority on all committees, in addition to monopolizing the 
chairmen’s post on all those committees. Therefore, political and economic change 
can only come from within the LDP for the moment.  
 
In October, 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro dissolved the HR after he 
was re-elected as the Liberal Democrat Party chief on September 20. The election 
was the first since Koizumi was named Prime Minister in April 2001. The major 
participants were the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) and the Democrat Party (DPJ). 
The LDP retains strong support in rural areas and among older voters due to heavy 
subsidies in agriculture, while the DPJ has had greater support among youth and in 
urban areas. However, this has tended to favor the LDP, because sparsely populated 
rural districts have disproportionate weight in Japan's electoral system.  
 
National newspapers concluded that the election benefited the Democrat Party 
(DPJ) more so than the LDP. The DPJ gained 40 more seats, making it the largest 
opposition party with a total HR membership of 177. Among those in the ruling 
coalition, only the New Clean Government Party (New Komeito) made gains, 
bringing its total HR membership to 34 from 31 members before the election.  
 
The LDP failed to achieve an absolute majority by itself, with only 237 seats, 
which required it to maintain its coalition with the New Clean Government Party and 
the New Conservative Party. Senior politicians in the LDP attributed the results to 
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disenfranchisement among traditional supporters of the LDP, resulting in an 
increased dependency on the coalition. Some politicians in the LDP are concerned 
about the influence of the New Clean Government Party on LDP policy because of 
the dependency. This revealed that the LDP failed to capture abundant support from 
non-old agriculture sector in order to maintain its majority in the Diet after 1993, so 
it is risky or even impossible for the LDP to keep its status by not working with other 
parties and forming coalitions in the future. 
 
The 2003 poll was unprecedented in the degree to which coalition candidates 
stuck to unified campaign pledges and the coalition parties cooperated in arranging 
combined candidates in particular constituency. Furthermore, the LDP’s overall 
performance in the election meant that a continuation of coalition arrangements was 
necessary because of the loss of its clear majority in the HR. Please see Figure 1 for 
details. 
 
Figure 1: The Checklist of Coalition Governments in the 1990s and early 2000s 
Prime Minister Participating Parties Dates 
Lower House elections, July 
1993 
Hosokawa 
JSP, Shinseito, Komeito, JNP, 
DSP, Sakigake, Shaminren, 
Minkarien (Rengo) 
August 1993 – April 1994 
Hata 
The above parties, not 
including  JSP and Sakigake 
April – June 1994 
Murayama LDP, JSP, Sakigake June 1994 – July 1995 
Upper House elections, July 
1995 
Murayama 
LDP, JSP, Sakigake July 1995 – Jan 1996 
Hashimoto LDP, JSP, Sakigake January – October 1996 
Lower House elections, 
October 1996 
Hashimoto 
LDP, (JSP and Sakigake) 
supported government but not 
in it 
October 1996 – 1998 
Upper House elections, July 
1998 
Obuchi 
LDP, Liberal Party (Jiyuto) 
January 1999 – September 
1999 
 
Obuchi 
 
Above parties + Komeito 
 
September 1999 – April 2000 
April, 2000 
Mori 
Above parties + Komeito April, 2000 - July, 2000 
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Upper House elections, July 
2000 
Mori 
 
Above parties + Komeito 
 
July 2000 - April 2001 
April 2001 
   Lower House elections,  
       Nov 2003 
Koizumi 
LDP + Komeito and New 
Conservative Party (NKP) 
April 2001 – Nov 2003 
Upper House elections,  
July 2004 
Koizumi 
LDP + Komeito Nov 2003 – Sept 2005 
 
 
3.2 Events leading to the July 1993 Election 
Members of Japan’s HR are elected to four-year terms, and another election was 
not due until February 1994, but in 1993 the HR was dissolved as a result of the 
successful no-confidence motion against the Miyazawa government, only the second 
time since the formation of the LDP that a no-confidence motion had actually carried 
out (Jain, 1993, p.1073). The political reform that was being initiated the main issue 
that resulted in the no-confidence vote against the government. In the beginning of 
1990s, social discontent reached a peak and the Japanese strove for a “clean” 
government and new political phenomenon.  
 
The ever-increasing corruption in Japanese politics was one of the factors which 
resulting in the no-confidence vote. As discussed earlier in this chapter the post-war 
election system stimulated the competition between different members of the LDP 
and this serious competition within the same party led to a reliance on a large pool of 
money from the corporate and business. Elections were very much candidate-based 
rather than party-centered and policy-based. This led to the pervasive and 
much-criticised “money politics”. In the second half of the 1980s and the beginning 
of the 1990s, several scandals involving LDP politicians were exposed, culminating 
in 1992, the Takeshita faction was the largest in the LDP and by far the most 
influential in Japanese politics. However, Takeshita’s involvement in the Recruit 
scandal and Kanemaru Shin’s resignation from the Diet in November 1992, due to 
his admission of receiving 500 million yen in illegal political contributions was 
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followed in March 1993 by another corruption scandal which further damaged the 
image and popularity of the LDP when the LDP kingmaker and former vice-president, 
Kanemaru, was arrested and faced trial on charges of evading taxes on his massive 
personal fortune, a large part of which he allegedly obtained through secret donations 
from construction contractors (Jain, 1993, p.1077).  
 
The economic down-turn since 1990s and the LDP government’s failure to tackle 
the situation effectively led the Japanese to ask for “clean” and “capable” new 
government. The burst of the economic “bubble” with the historically high 
unemployment rate, all these accelerated the urge for the change. Moreover, the 
campaign financing scandals, such as the Recruit Scandal, further undermined the 
popularity of the LDP. 
 
The Japan New Party (1992) was the first one to challenge the LDP as a 
conservative opposition rival, in contrast to the mainly centre-left opposition 
challenges for most of the postwar period, but it was the defection of a large number 
of LDP MP’s into the Japan Renewal Party (1993) and the New Harbinger Party 
(1993) that was the key event which ended decades of the LDP rule (Babb, 1999). 
Moreover, the oldest of these was the Japan New Party which was formed in May 
1992 under the leadership of Hosokawa Morihiro, formerly an HC member from the 
Tanaka faction and governor (1983-91). In early 1993, Hosokawa’s popularity began 
to increase and enjoyed a support rate of more than 10% (Jain, 1993, p. 1072).  
 
The LDP maintained a majority of seats in both houses of the Diet from 1955 
until 1989, when it lost its majority in the HC in 1989, getting only 36 seats, while 
the JSP won 46 seats. Therefore, in 1989, the LDP lost control of the HC.  
 
However, in 1993, the LDP also lost its majority in the HR. Not only because the 
LDP lost many votes, but also because 3 more parties – the JNP, Sakigake and J.R.P 
emerged and captured massive votes in the expense of the LDP in which the JNP, 
Sakigake and JRP won a total of 103 seats. The LDP only won 223 seats of the 511 
total, and was totally expelled from the core of power.  
 
The early 1990s finally brought vindication to the perennial losers –opposition 
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parties. In 1989, the LDP lost an election and control of the HC of the Diet. This was 
followed in 1993 by defections of Ozawa faction from the LDP, by the LDP losing 
control of the HR, and by the first non – LDP government since the party’s formation 
in 1955.  
 
 
3.3 Japan’s New Electoral System 
The rules of the game for the election system changed in the 1990s. First, 
traditionally that the election system was favorable for rural areas where the LDP had 
been particularly strong. However, since some of the population had shifted from the 
rural areas to urban areas, the Diet made some adjustments and redistributed some 
rural seats to urban seats. The adjustments made in December 1992 resulted in 
cutting out ten rural seats and added nine urban ones, thus reducing the total 
membership of the HR from 512 to 511 (Jain, 1993, p. 1081). As discussed, the vote 
from the rural areas is one of the main pillars for the LDP in elections. The 
redistribution of seats among rural and urban districts changed the election 
mechanism and damaged the advantageous position that the LDP had in the former 
election system in the pre-1990s period. It is no longer easy for the LDP to maintain 
its dominance in elections with the support of the agriculture sector.  
 
Later on, the Japanese national legislature (Diet) passed electoral reform 
measures on three separate occasions. First, in March, 1994, bills were passed which 
changed the election system for the House of Representatives, altered campaign 
regulations, and created public subsidies for political parties. Two of these bills 
amended the existing legislation; two other bills created new laws. (Christensen, 
1996, p.67). 
 
The new Japanese electoral system is a hybrid of plurality and proportional 
representation (PR) system.  In total, three hundred of the five hundred seats in the 
HR are allocated to each of three hundred new electoral districts, while the remaining 
two hundred seats are allocated by PR system. Japan was divided up into seven 
regional PR districts, and based on the population, each district elected from seven to 
thirty-three representatives. Voters selected parties, and seats were allocated to the 
parties based on each party’s share of the vote in that district (Christensen, 1996, p. 
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51).  
 
This kind of voting system created incentives for small parties to form coalitions 
to win the only one seat in each district. As Christensen (1996, p. 52) argued, “Voters 
will select one candidate in each district, and there will be only one victor in each 
district. These districts create strong incentives for small parties to merge or at least 
form electoral coalitions that have a chance of winning the support of half the 
electorate in each of these districts”.  
 
Also, the proportional representative (PR) system actually encouraged the 
survival of the smaller size political parties since they were only need to get a part of 
the votes in order to secure one seat in the election. PR districts drastically reduced 
victory thresholds and gave the opportunities for small and minor parties. Thus the 
single-seat districts and the PR districts produced contradictory incentives since the 
single-member seats reduced the opportunities of the small parties to join but the 
remaining seats in PR election method could motivate the small parties to join. Three 
hundred seats are contestable only by parties large enough to attract nearly 50 
percent of the voters in a district; the other two hundred seats can be won by parties 
that can get the support of only 3, 5, or 10 percent of the voters in a PR region. The 
rules of the game in the election system changed significantly. The situation is totally 
different from was it has been in the former SNTV of plurality electoral system, for 
the LDP could no longer be assured of hegemony in the new hybrid of plurality and 
proportional representation (PR) election system. 
 
Candidates have larger chances to be elected in the HR and HC respectively. As 
the electoral rules allow candidates to run in the local single-seat districts and to be 
list on a party PR list in the same election (dual-listed candidate must run in local, 
single-seat districts that are within the bounds of the PR regional district in which 
they are listed). In addition to it, such dual-listed candidates can also be given 
identical numerical rankings on the PR list. If the dual-list candidate wins in his/her 
local district, then her name would be removed from the party list for the PR district 
since she has already been elected (Christensen, 1996, p.59). In return, it makes the 
election result more unpredictable and complicated. 
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The contradictory effects of the electoral system seemingly reducing and at the 
same time increasing the motivations of the small political parties to get elected 
(Christensen 1996, p.59), besides, the new Japanese election system also includes 
legal barriers to the electoral access of small parties. For instance, a party must win 3 
percent of the vote nationwide to be eligible to win any PR seats. Another barrier 
exists for small parties if they want to register to be on the PR ballot in a district, they 
should meet at least one of the three following conditions: (1) in the most recent 
national election, the party received at least 2 percent of the nationwide vote; (2) the 
party has at least five sitting members of the HR and the HC combined; or (3) the 
party listed a sufficient number of candidates on its PR district list equal to at least 20 
percent of the seats up for election in that district.  
 
Besides some strict requirements, the law also requires a deposit of 600,000 yen 
per candidate which only refunded depending on the number of victors that the party 
has. If the party did not win any PR seats, it would lose its entire deposit 
(Christensen, 1996, p.67). Therefore, this law also encouraged parties to merge in 
order to get the entry qualification to the election. 
 
The political reforms also placed additional restrictions on the fundraising 
activities of individual politicians. The added burden of these new restrictions is 
compensated for by (1) a new programme of national subsidies of political parties 
and (2) the relatively unfettered fundraising abilities of political parties. 
 
The reforms attempt to channel political money into routes other than the 
traditional fundraising that resulted in money politics (Christensen, 1996; Stockwin, 
2003; Mulgan, 2003; Hrebenar, 2000). The reform stipulated that each candidate is 
now allowed only one official fundraising organization. Corporations and other 
organizations can contribute only 500,000 yen in a calendar year to a politician’s 
official fundraising organization and this fundraising activity would be completely 
banned after five years.  
 
Corporations and other organizations would then be allowed to give money only 
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to political parties. In addition to it, only political parties are allowed to give money 
directly to candidates; this provision is designed to make it difficult for factional 
organizations to give campaign funds to their members (Christensen, 1996, p.63). 
Reporting thresholds were also lowered for most instances of political giving. An 
individual or organization’s contributions to either a party or a candidate’s official 
fundraising organization must be reported if such donations exceed 100,000 yen in a 
calendar year. Purchases of tickets to fundraising events must be reported if a person 
or organization purchases more then 200,000 of tickets at a single event.  
 
On the other side, individual contributions to political parties and political 
organizations are encouraged. Such donations have been made tax deductible. In a 
calendar year an individual may give a total of 20 million yen to political parties and 
political fundraising organizations. An individual may contribute an additional 10 
million yen a year as political contributions to other recipients (Christensen, 1996, 
p.67). 
 
Moreover, the fourth set of bills provided for the strengthening of the penalties on 
misbehavior. The candidates, their family members, their office staff, and their 
campaign managers can all separately or jointly held responsible for any election 
campaign irregularities or illegal handling of political funds (Christensen, 1996; 1994; 
2000; Cheol, 2001). 
 
 
3.4 Effects of New Electoral Laws 
Although the laws were passed in 1994, the first opportunity for voting under 
these new arrangements did not come until 1996; HR elections were also held in 
2000 and 2003. It was predicted initially that the changes of the electoral laws would 
result in the changes of the number of political parties exist. However, at the same 
time, as Christensen (1996; p.59) has observed, the rules of the game in Japan 
political system changed as “the electoral reforms increase the likelihood that 
coalition governments will become common. The party realignment that has 
occurred will make coalition governments much more common in Japan”.  
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The reason was that assuming all things being equal, the new electoral system 
gave the largest party such a huge bonus of seats that the party should not need 
coalition partners to govern. However, the electoral reform and party realignment 
have split the LDP, and if two parties split the single-seat districts, it is likely that 
neither party will pick up a sufficient number of seats in the PR races to become a 
majority party. Coalition governments will therefore become more common under 
the new electoral system.  
  
Another important implication of the new electoral system in the new regime was 
to end the money politics. It was found to be less effective in achieving this aim 
mainly due to two main reasons. First, the flow of money from business to political 
kingmakers could continue unabated since businesses would still be able to give 
money to both national and local party organizations. As the dominant party leader in 
that area, they will still control the local party chapters. Businesses will still be able 
to contribute funds to as many local party organizations as their favorite politician in 
every town, and neighbourhood of a candidate’s election district (Christensen, 1994; 
1996).  
 
Second, business contributions that are given to national party organizations can 
still be allocated to influential politicians. A business donor need only specify 
informally that the funds contributed are to be controlled by a specific party member. 
That means the contribution of money to the party would be actually given to 
someone that the business has been supporting (Christensen, 1994; 1996).  
 
Hrebenar (2000, p.80) stated that tickets for fund-raising “parti” events still offer 
politicians a loophole that allows them to hide the donors of some of their funds. 
Buyers of tickets for fund-raising parties of less than 200,000 yen do not have to be 
reported. The 1998 Political Funds Control Law (PFCL) report noted the significance 
of “parti” money generated for individual politicians. The biggest fund-raising 
“parti” of 1997 was held by the Mitsuzuka faction and produced nearly 3 billion yen 
for the faction. Other prominent LDP leaders also did well at such “parti” events, 
with nineteen of the top twenty two such events generating money for either LDP 
factions or senior LDP politicians. The Democratic Party generated more than 2.6 
 45
billion yen; Ozawa, leader of the Liberal Party, produced 1.6 billion yen; and the 
Sakigake got a little over 1 billion yen (Asahi Shimbun, September 11, 1998).  
 
The electoral system seems to be not so effective in solving these problems of 
money politics. Also, the LDP had earlier controversially decided to allow the 
donations to continue despite legislation to the contrary, but Obuchi reversed the 
decision in the face of strong criticism from within the ruling coalition, especially 
New Komeito, and opposition among the general public. It is obvious that the LDP 
took into consideration the likely effects on the administration's political foundation 
and the next HR general election. Aiming to gain back public support and popularity, 
on September 11, 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi, who was the LDP president, 
officially announced that the “LDP has decided to ban political donations from 
business corporations and organizations to individual politicians funds-management 
organizations from next year.” The announcement was delivered during Obuchi's 
face-to-face debate with opposition leaders (Daily Yomiuri, September 11, 1999).  
 
It is clear that the electoral reform was one of the means used by the Hosokawa 
government to make it more difficult for the LDP to return to power again. If we 
assume this was the main purpose of the electoral reform, we can count this is a 
successful reform. The new election system leads to the change of the rules of the 
game as well as the election mechanism in Japan. The hybrid of plurality and 
proportional representation system (PR) system encouraged the formation of new 
political parties and mergers. The PR system makes it easier for small parties to 
survive in the election and leads the LDP tended to look to different coalitions of 
interest groups support as a way to compete against their party colleagues, which 
greatly damaged the advantage of the LDP in the election mechanism. The reform 
creates a more competitive party system, with the potential to lead to an alternation 
of parties in power. We can see the introduction of a new electoral system 
precipitated the collapse of the one-party dominant regime in its initial impact, but, 
as for what its impact is going to be over the long term, it seems to have generated 
pressures both for party consolidation and fragmentation and make it difficult for the 
LDP to gain majority on its own. 
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3.5 The impact on factional politics 
It was expected that the institutional changes would produce a drastic change in 
factional dynamics within the LDP, since only one candidate can be endorsed and 
elected in a single-member district system, so intra-party competition in the same 
district would end. Candidates would be less likely to disclose their factional 
affiliation to enhance their chances of receiving cross-factional support; as a 
consequence, factions were not expected to receive new members. In addition to it, 
faction leaders were expected to lose their ability to mobilize funds since public 
monies were to be channeled directly to the party headquarters under the new law on 
funding. Faction leaders thus would lose some of their authority to control how party 
money was distributed (Cheol, 2001, p. 431). 
 
The effects of political reform are more refractive in the sense that the faction 
managers were working harder to mold and bend their organizations to conform to 
their own preferences and organizational interests in a changed institutional 
environment. Factions did not simply disappear; rather, they have preserved their 
organizational form but with different attributes (Cheol, 2001, p.433).  
 
The prediction of the decline of recruiting new member did not happen. Even 
though there no longer is competition among incumbent members in the elections 
themselves, fierce competition does arise to win party nomination when seats 
become available in any given district. Faction leaders are desperate to place 
members of their own faction in those districts. Thus, the sense of competition has 
shifted from the post-endorsement stage to the pre-endorsement one (Cheol, 1998, 
2001).  
 
With respect to the new reluctance to disclose factional allegiances, Cox et al 
(1999, p.44) argued that “undisclosed” does not mean “unaffiliated”. LDP candidates 
have little incentive to declare their factional affiliation before they get elected 
because it reduces their chances to obtain electoral support from other factions.  
 
Besides, there is no empirical evidence to indicate that factions have given up on 
recruiting new members. In fact, rather than giving up recruiting in the aftermath of 
the reforms, factions have persisted in their efforts to add members. The general 
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convention of the Eto-Kamei faction held on November 4, 1999, well before the 
2000 general election, saw some 16 individuals step up on the stage to be introduced 
as new members (Cheol, 2001, p.445).  
 
Other factions also engaged in similar practices and newspaper analysts continue 
to identify the factional affiliation of new candidates with complete certainty. That 
the reforms have not blunted the efforts of factions to grow can be seen in the way in 
which the Hashimoto faction went from being the LDP’s third largest faction in 1993 
to once again being its largest by the decade’s end. Leaders of the faction made 
aggressive recruitment efforts among junior Diet members in order to recoup the 
losses the faction experienced after the departure of the Ozawa group in 1993.  
 
The changes in the funding law influenced the potential contributors to individual 
Diet members. The faction’s fund-raising role is shifting from centralized 
mobilization and distribution of money to providing an umbrella for individualized 
mobilization through mutual assistance. Politicians rely more on their own efforts to 
raise the funds they need, which they do through attracting private contributions or 
by holding fund-raising parties (Asahi Shinbun, 1999).  
 
Cheol (2001, p.459) argued that factions now mobilize less than one-tenth of the 
money that they had been able to under the old system, according to Ochiai Kazuo, 
administrative secretary of the former Nakasone faction (Ochiai, 1999). Accordingly, 
factions have only a nominal amount of money to distribute to their members. An 
LDP member told Cheol that he received 2 million yen two times a year from his 
faction but that could only cover a month’s worth of telephone and postage bills 
(Takemoto, 1999).  
 
Though numerous LDP members made it clear that they receive less money from 
LDP headquarter than they do from their factions, the proportion of the money that 
will be channeled to individual LDP members is relatively minimal. As far as 
funding is concerned, individual politicians are responsible for generating the money 
they need from all imaginable sources. The money distributed by either a faction or 
the party is just a show of their loyalty to their parties (Cheol, 2001, p.461).  
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3.6 Other factors contributing to the new regime - LDP coalition rule  
 
3.6.1  Ozawa Defection 
First, the Ozawa defection in 1993 shocked the entire regime and ensured that the 
LDP could not get majority in the following no-confidence vote and the HR election. 
The rule of the LDP ended in 1993. After a money scandal involving former LDP 
vice-president Kanemaru, one LDP faction, led by former LDP secretary-general 
Ozawa Ichiro, left the party and created a new one called “Shinsei-to” (the Japan 
Renewal Party, or JRP).  
 
Actually, many studies reveals that Ozawa was the key actor in 1993 because he 
led the most significant defection of politicians from the LDP; an act that brought 
down the government. Ironically, the movement’s leader, Ozawa, was a most 
unlikely reformer – a protégé of scandal –tainted Prime Minister Tanaka and the heir 
to a long line of corrupt, money-oriented LDP politicians. He put together the 
non-LDP coalition government that took power after the 1993 election. Ozawa’s 
defection is one of the main reasons for the ending of the LDP hegemony in 1993. 
 
The Ozawa faction not only defected, but also formed a coalition government 
with all the anti-LDP parties except the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The Ozawa 
faction had been “owned” at first by former Prime Minister Tanaka and later by 
former Prime Minister Takeshita. Both of them resigned because of bribery scandals. 
At one time, Ozawa’s was the biggest faction in the LDP and was considered to be 
able to obtain and use the most money. If one thinks of anti-LDP parties as uncorrupt 
and unconcerned about having seats in the cabinet, it might seem strange that the 
critics of the LDP ’s “money politics” or corruption formed a coalition government 
with this faction (Otake, 1996, p.336) 
 
Therefore, in order to avoid public criticism of money politics and the execution 
failure of the LDP government, Ozawa and his coalition partners strived for the 
change of election rules in 1994 in order to recast themselves as the champion of 
political reform.  
 
Mulgan (2003, p.47) also observed that there is a number of reasons for making 
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the coalition became possible. The first reason was some of the LDP’s coalition or 
loose alliance partners contain constituents who were formerly from the LDP camp 
itself, such as the Liberal, Conservative and Sakigake parties. And this is a reflection 
of restructuring in the party system which reached a peak in 1993 to 1998. Many of 
Japan’s new opposition parties were formally under the LDP. This not only damaged 
the factionalism and harmony among the factions of the LDP, but also formed a 
strong anti-LDP force. In order to tackle these powerful anti-LDP forces, the LDP 
had no means but to build close cohesion and formed coalition with other parties. 
 
Second, the opposition parties that formerly did not have enough experience and 
leadership talents became more experienced in this stage, for all the main opposition 
parties or their predecessor organizations, except for the Japan Communist Party 
(JCP), have gained government and leadership experience in coalitions and therefore 
they are better potential partners in LDP-led coalition. 
 
Third, since the loss of its dominant power, the LDP was anxious to regain power, 
so the LDP then put aside its long-standing confrontation with the SDPJ on matters 
such as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the status of the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Curtis (1999, p.189) 
mentioned that “the LDP and JSP had been traditional archenemies, but now that 
alliance with the Socialists was the only way the LDP could return to power, LDP 
leaders, who for years had accused the Socialist Party of undermining political 
stability and compromising the national interest”.  
 
In the pre-1990s period, it was not so much characterized by conflict between the 
LDP and the JSP. The formation of coalition between them was only a kind of 
division of labour. The LDP managed the alliance with the United States, the 
Socialists keep open lines of communication to the Soviet Union and China. They 
somehow showed conflict in publicly-visible Diet sessions, but they actually 
cooperated behind the scenes and developed close personal relations. This policy 
flexibility provided a favourable environment for the coalition of the two 
oppositional parties. 
 
Fourth, the differences on policy issues amongst the majority of Japan’s political 
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parties have become less clear in the 1990s than in the previous decades. The 
situation was that the diminished differences between the LDP and the largest single 
opposition party since 1993 – the Democratic Party (DPJ) – on various policies 
including security and defence, compared with the much sharper policy differences 
that existed between the LDP and the opposition Socialist Party and JCP during the 
years of LDP one-party rule regime. 
 
Fifth, the credit that LDP claimed from the economic prosperity in the pre-1980s 
had been totally eroded due to the long economic recession since 1990. Moreover, 
the new election law together with the bursting economic bubble forced the business 
sector to change their relations with the political parties. The Keidanren moved away 
from using donations to secure its interest to publicising its favored policies and 
participating in government economic panels, which weakened the funding raising 
ability and the cohesion with business sector dramatically in the LDP-lead coalition 
regime.  
 
To conclude, the political institutions of Japan, as far as the electoral system, the 
inter-party relationships and the intra-LDP dynamics, were found to be changed 
substantially in the pre and post-1993 period. In the pre-1993 period, the 
conservative LDP held a lion’s share of the seats in both the HR and the HC for 
nearly 40 years. The reason for the dominance of the LDP was the support of the 
business sector since the LDP dominance provided a favourable environment for the 
growth of business. The close relationship between the agriculture sectors due to the 
protectionist industrial policy also played a extent role in maintaining the stability of 
the LDP.  However, the rules of the game and the mechanisms in the political 
system changed substantially in the 1990s. 
 
The formation of the coalition party system since 1993 has not been a static 
situation, but rather the formation of the governments has been changing under the 
leadership of the LDP (except for the period from August 1993-June 1994). 
Therefore starting from post-1993, or at least post-1994 the regime of Japan was 
changed from LDP dominance to LDP-led coalition. It was mainly due to the 
changes of Japan in the early 1990s in which Japan underwent a change in the rules 
of the game, in which the change in public policies, and the changes of the electoral 
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system created a major change for the political development of Japan. Since some 
politicians are for single-member election but some are for proportional 
representative system (PR), this created changes in the factional politics of the LDP, 
but, nevertheless, the intra-party and inter-party competition still exists in Japan. The 
changes in campaign finance reform did not end the money politics in Japan but 
rather different factions in LDP and other parties changed their attributes and 
behaviour in response to them. It was somehow difficult for the LDP to earn a 
predominant share of the votes right now since the rules of the game in the LDP-led 
coalition regime are no more as stable and predictable as they were in the LDP 
dominance regime.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Socio-economic coalition: Pre-1990s and Post-1990s periods 
 
 
As argued by Pempel (1998, p.21), there can be considered to be three major 
pillars in a regime, which are interlocking with each other. Detailed explanations on 
the changes on political institutions were discussed in the previous chapter while the 
public policies paradigm in the pre-1990s and post-1990s will also be discussed in 
the next chapter. The changes in the socio-economic coalition in Japan in those 
particular periods of time were also obvious in Japan. The changes co-existed with 
the correlation of the changes in political institution and the public policies paradigm. 
It has been argued that the socio-economic coalition is the base and foundation for 
any regime anywhere, but especially in Japan in which a strong connection existed 
between business sectors and bureaucracy and political parties, as well as the 
agricultural sector. In this chapter, the changes in socio-economic coalition in the 
pre-1990s and post-1990s periods are explained. Analysis will be put on the 
interactions between the changes in socio-economic coalition with the political 
institutions and public policy paradigm in Japan.  The chapter will start with the 
general description of the social-economic foundation of Japan in the pre-1990s and 
post-1990s period and the analysis in relation with the political regime and the public 
policy will also be discussed.  
 
 
1. Pre-1990s socio-economic regime in Japan 
 
It was crucial to understand that the socio-economic base is reflected in the 
character of any regime. It was perhaps important to understand the socio-economic 
coalition of Japan in the pre-1990s period before drawing the comparison with the 
more recent period.  
 
Many scholars have drawn attention to the so-called “iron triangle” to explain 
the close and interdependent relationships between the LDP, business sector and the 
bureaucracy (Maclachlan, 2004, p.68). The LDP had been in power for such a long 
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time that important policy decisions have inevitably revolved around the 
conservative party and its internal political processes. The bureaucrats as well as 
various interest groups, large and small, played important parts in the 
decision-making system. The bureaucrats are responsible for drafting and proposing 
the bill to the Diet and taking control of the execution. Whereas, the business sector 
devotes their “support” to bureaucrats and political parties in order to strive for 
favourable policy and business environment. Legislators in the National Diet have 
the authority to vote for “pass” or “veto” the bill. The real situation was the interplay 
of relative power between each actor in the Japanese policymaking process 
(Hrebenar, 2000, p.245). Yanaga (1968, p.95) also stated that organized business, the 
party government, and the administrative bureaucracy are the “three legs” of the 
“tripod” on which the Japanese political system rests. Functionally, they are 
interdependent, even though they operate for the most part in distinct areas.  
 
Burks (1991, p.164) also stated that the top LDP chieftains, high-level 
bureaucrats, and powerful business leaders built a close-knit network that gave it a 
very favourable environment for success and exerts great influence among the 
society. Elitist theory sees these three groups as holding compatible interests and 
values and as acting together to produce policies that benefit all three and thus 
entrench their power position, and policymaking to be a result of the interactions 
among the various factions of the LDP, the various groups of bureaucrats, and 
diversified business interests (Hrebenar, 2000, p.251).   
 
The socio-economic base of the rule of Japan was on an alliance among big 
and small business as well as organized agriculture. In Japan, no business-labour 
alliance emerged; rather, business and agriculture forged an anti-labour ‘alliance’that 
relied, not on an open domestic market, but on mercantilist policies. The 
relationships between business (including large and small) and organized agriculture 
was so close that they would like to influence and maintain the status quos of the 
public policies of Japan by preventing changes from mercantilism to an open market 
economy. We can find that business sectors exerted great influence to the 
bureaucracy and political parties in the one-party dominant regime in the pre-1990s.  
Yet, Sugimoto (1997, p.23) also stated the importance of the bureaucracy in the “Iron 
Triangle” in Japan. Bureaucracy holds supreme authority over business sectors in 
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Japan because government ministries control licensing, permitting and the 
implementation of publicly-funded projects which gives such a wide range of power 
over the business activities. Moreover, bureaucrats are responsible for preparing the 
bills for social goods and favorable business environment. Bills prepared by 
bureaucrats for the National Diet also need to be deliberated by the legislators, 
especially those of the government parties.  
 
In the aspect, it was believed that mercantilism is one of the outcomes of the 
“iron triangle” which was aided by the alliance and also served to keep the members 
of that alliance close with each other. The policy was also due to the conservative and 
dominant power of the LDP in which it would like to strive for the economic 
prosperity in the post-war period and also help to enlist the support of the business 
sector and the agricultural sector. Therefore, we can see mercantilism is an ideology 
in Japan which helps to keep harmony of the socio-economic coalition and formed 
the so called “Iron Triangle” model in Japan.  
 
The benefits of mercantilism to the alliance’s participants were obvious. For 
example, by the end of 1960 Japan’s net fixed capital stock was 14,353 yen billion 
but by the end of 1971 it had grown 327 percent to 46,880 billion yen (Dekle, 1989, 
p.353). Moreover, because government restrictions limited competition from 
technologically and managerially sophisticated and capital-rich overseas firms, 
Japanese products dominated the expanding domestic market, securing for Japanese 
manufacturers a solid home base from which to expand their markets internationally. 
This sort of restriction prevented the intensive competition of local business from the 
international market and in return gain the support of the business sector in the 
pre-1990s period. 
 
In a similar situation, the export-driven economic success, the protective 
fortress (mercantilism) for agriculture and small businesses, and the continued stream 
of direct subsidies, tax incentives and other favorable policies continued the 
collaboration of these key sectors. Small-business owners also benefited from direct 
assistance programmes as well as from a politically-driven laxity in the enforcement 
of labour, environmental, and tax laws. As Calder argued there were many policies 
that benefited the interests of the small businesses, including credit policies, loans 
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provision, preferential trade policies and tax policies. As late as the early 1970s, 
agricultural expenditures as a proportion of total government spending were typically 
four times greater in Japan than in France, Britain, the United States, or West 
Germany (Calder, 1988, p.253). In regard to the income of farmers in agricultural 
sector, farm families remained as high as those in urban and manufacturing areas 
while regional income disparities were also kept low. Farm subsidies were so 
extensive that it was argued that “rice farmers and agricultural cooperatives had 
become political wards of the state”. (Donnelly, 1977, p.53). The continued high 
growth was essential to maintaining such costly economic inefficiency. The high 
growth rate in economy in the 1960s and 1970s enabled the government to provide 
subsidies to the farming sector and preferential policies to the business sectors, to get 
their support to the dominance of the LDP.  
 
It was shown that the strong cohesion of the business sectors and the 
agricultural sectors were mainly due to the interests in maintaining the mercantilist 
industrial and economic policies, which in result helps to strengthen the stability and 
legitimacy of the LDP dominance regime for 38 years. The interested sectors were 
afraid that their interests would be harmed by not supporting the government as well 
as the largest and most dominant political party (i.e. the LDP).  The changes in 
political institutions would definitely result in the changes in the public policies 
paradigm, so all these conservative forces - business and agricultural sectors did not 
want the changes to take place to the LDP one-party dominance regime. 
  
 
1.1 What are the characteristics of the business sector in Japan in pre-1990s period? 
There were several important business structures in Japan in the pre-1990s 
period and all of them were interrelated to the dominance of the LDP and the public 
polices. In the pre-1990s period, most of the individual companies in Japan were 
large firms that dominated the business. In the pre-1990s, the largest businesses, 
which employed more than a thousand workers each, together accounted for about 
one-quarter of the nation’s productivity.  
 
Besides the monopoly of the large business in Japan, there were some unique 
characteristics of the Japanese firms on employment workforce, including lifelong 
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employment on some core workforce who were graduates of high-ranking 
universities in Japan, for instance Tokyo University. They signed a lifelong contract 
with the firm to work until they were retired or the company was closed. They rarely 
faced layoffs and they might be only forced to get early retirement in case of 
financial difficulties of the company. In that sense, all the core workers were treated 
as company assets and core workers were place in an important position in the 
company. This sort of phenomenon was happened in almost every large business in 
Japan and was a unique characteristic of large business. 
 
Furthermore, in large companies, company practices aimed to retain the core 
workforce by getting their support, such as through including them into the 
discussion of new management practices and technologies that the companies would 
like to launch in the future, intrafirm training programmes, supervisory selection 
based on technical knowledge and leadership as well as joint consultation between 
labour and management at the plant level. The joint consultation between workers 
and the big business also helped enhancing the relationships and preventing core 
workers from using radical and politicized national union federations. It has often 
been observed that only if such consultations did not successfully resolve issues did 
the labour union push for collective bargaining. These would help increasing the 
overlap and interests between the managers and the core workforce of the company.  
 
The working practices in Japan were based on the mutual respect and benefit 
approach and those large companies regarded the core workforce as the assets of 
their companies rather than short-term and contractual workers.  The view of 
considering them as a long-term investment would certainly demand a stable public 
policy from the government and thereby big business could invest for their future 
through predictable policies especially under the LDP dominance. This was easier 
when politics were almost guaranteed to be under conservative control and rule and 
so as the public policies formed by the conservative LDP. 
 
Bieda (1970, p.47) stated that one of the key components of the business 
structure in Japan in the pre-1990s period was the trading company. It has 
multifarious purposes and activities. Japan has around six thousand trading 
companies, but only about forty was engaged in world trading activities. The most 
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prominent include Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsui Bussan, C. Itoh, Marubeni, and Nissho 
organizations. The largest two trading companies, the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, and 
Mitsui and Company had more than 100 branches each all over the world. Their 
annual sales in 1969 were at the rate of US$6 billion, which would give each of them 
the rank of one of the twenty trading countries in the world.  
 
In the pre-1990s, the top ten companies handled between 50 to 60 percent of 
all of Japan’s trade, as well as 20 percent of domestic wholesales business. The total 
value of their operations was typically twice the national budget and 30 percent of 
GNP. In 1969, they accounted for about 50 percent of Japan’s export and about 60 
percent of her imports (Bieda, 1970, p.58).  
 
It was no doubt that the trading companies would like to get preferential 
treatment from the government, especially in the areas of promoting exports and 
restricting the imports of products from other nations. As mentioned, only forty of 
them were engaged in world activities and thereby most of them were doing business 
in the domestic market. The mercantilism industrial and economic policies would 
assist them in protecting the domestic market in Japan. Furthermore, since most of 
the trading companies are large business in Japan, they would also like to see 
predictable policies carried out by the LDP and its policies in protecting their internal 
market and facilitating them in the external markets as well.  
 
The close relationship of the business sector also appeared in the form of 
keiretsu. Keiretsu usually refers to a uniquely Japanese form of corporate 
organization. A keiretsu is a grouping or family of affiliated companies that form a 
tight-knit alliance to work toward each other's mutual success. The keiretsu system is 
also based on an intimate partnership between government and businesses. It can best 
be understood as the intricate web of relationships that links banks, manufacturers, 
suppliers, and distributors with the Japanese government (Pempel, 1998, p.327). 
 
Keiretsu operate globally and are integrated both vertically and horizontally. 
They are organized around their own trading companies and banks. Each major 
keiretsu is capable of controlling nearly every step of the economic chain in a variety 
of industrial, resource and service sectors.  
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There are horizontal and vertical keiretsu. Horizontal keiretsu included 
twenty to forty or more firms of relatively similarly size that operate in different 
functional areas or markets. They are usually headed by major Japanese banks and 
include the “Big Six” -- Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo Bank Groups. Vertical keiretsu are industrial groups connecting 
manufacturers and part suppliers or manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. They 
represent only 0.1 percent of Japan’ total companies, but contributed to around 
roughly one-quarter of the national GNP during the postwar period (Pempel, 1998, 
p.358).   
Vertical keiretsu involve connections from the large firms at the top of a 
pyramid down through as many as five layers of ever smaller and more specialized 
subcontractors, distributors, and capital-dependent firms. For instance, the vertical 
keiretsu include car and electronics producers (Toyota, Nissan, Honda -- Matsushita, 
Hitachi, Toshiba, Sony) and their “captive” subcontractors. Distribution keiretsu, a 
subgroup of vertical keiretsu, control much of Japanese retailing, determining what 
products will appear in stores and showrooms and at what price (Clark, 1971; 
Hadley,1970; Gerlach, 1992)  
In the vertical keiretsu, power was concentrated at the top of the hierarchy. 
Contractors typically divided orders among several subcontractors to gain multiple 
alternative sources for needed parts while keeping relatively small inventories and 
thus holding down fixed costs. The vertical keiretsu as well often provided vital 
connections for small firms since small firms are vertically connected with the larger 
high valued-added firms. In Japan, usually larger firms at the top will deliver 
techniques and managerial skills to the subcontractors. These sorts of managerial 
skills delivery can assist smaller firms to updated their skills, practices and 
technologies, help them to increase their productivity and even providing them needs 
when they have any operational problems. These sorts of assistance could definitely 
reduce the conflicts and competition between large firms and small firms and can 
even connect them with each other in striving for the economic interests. The results 
of keiretsu will create interdependent relationships between large and small firms and 
increase their internal bonds.  
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The interdependent relationships of the keiretsu could reduce the conflicts 
and competition between the large and small businesses. The internal cohesion of the 
business sector can facilitate making a consistent position towards the government 
and reflecting their views and interests in a stronger manner. As mentioned 
beforehand, the public policies of the LDP were to encourage exports and restrict 
imports. These sorts of policies were designed for the interest of the business sector. 
The existence of keiretsu would also reinforce the support of the mercantilism and 
the support of the LDP in controlling the power. 
Last but not least, individual industries that do not join the keiretsu in Japan 
also pursed the same common goals through trade associations. They formed into 
different trade associations in order to state out the voices and for their interests. 
Although there were four main trade associations, the most important was the 
Keidanren (the Federation of Employers Organisations). These sorts of trade 
associations had a relatively close relationship with the government and the LDP. 
Two Japanese government agencies have played primary roles in regulating and 
making use of trade associations: the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) and the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
Lynn and Mckeown (1988, p.56) argued that “these associations gather a 
wide range of data and provide technical information and market development 
strategies for their members. At various times they have served as enforcer of carter 
agreements, spokesman for the collective interests of individual sectors to both 
media and the government, consolidators of members opinions on matters of 
government policy, and conduits between government officials and firm members”.  
These associations had relatively close links with the bureaucrats.  
 
1.2 The relationship between organized business and the LDP 
 
Regarding organized business, Trevor (2001p.251) stated that business 
represented the national interest and, as such survival, raising living standards and 
expanding economic growth remained a national priority. In fact, organized business 
initiated and proposed policies. It sponsored and supported the party in power. The 
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business supported the different factions of the LDP with money to support their 
campaign and promotion activities.  
 
Yukio Ozaki claimed that “the leader of a party in our country must have five 
qualifications: one to four are money, and the fifth one is political ability” (Hrebenar, 
2000, p.58). Money is still the most crucial ingredient in political success. A great 
portion of the political activities of the major leaders of the various parties and 
factions is devoted to the raising of political funds. The primary source of LDP funds 
during the 1950s to 1990s was “corporate Japan”.  
 
During the late 1970s, Japanese business gave an officially reported total of about 
9 billion yen per year to the LDP. In addition, an estimated three to four times that 
total was transferred from the business community to factional leaders and politicians 
during a given year. The LDP established a special organization, Kokumin Seiji 
Kyokai, to facilitate the collection of corporate money for the LDP (Hrebenar, 2000, 
p.179).  
 
They gave money to political parties and also had a say in political decisions, 
wielding considerable influence. The group had made the government to give up 
plans to raise interest rates when it had political connotations; e.g. in 1956 four major 
economic organizations, the Keidanren3, Nikkeiren, the Japanese Association of 
Corporate Executives and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry forced 
the Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama to resign. Also, in the 1970s, Nihachiro 
Hanamura (Vice Chairman of Keidanren) relentlessly pressurised the LDP, yelling at 
them and forcing them to drop demands to raise corporate taxes.4 
 
The most important functions of the bureaucracy involve the protection and 
promotion of industry, in whose behalf it formulated long-term economic plans, 
made forecasts, set goals, and established priorities. Organized business provided 
members for the cabinet, the Diet, and government advisory councils and 
administrative commissions. It hired retired government officials as corporate 
                                                 
3 The Keidanren: Most powerful  business organization, which  has been described as the business 
community’s “general headquarters” 
4 Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), May 30, 2002 
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executives and trade association officials. In return for political contributions by 
organized business, the party in power (LDP) strove to create a political climate 
conducive to carrying on profitable business enterprises.  
  
Generally speaking, it can be argued that Japanese business groups before the 
1990s were generally well-organized and these served as a solid socio-economic 
coalition for supporting the dominance of the LDP and its public policy especially in 
the economic and industrial part. Moreover, the keiretsu in both horizontal and 
vertical parts were highly integrated and structured. These structures could facilitate 
the close relationship of the business sectors and unified their roles in supporting the 
roles of LDP and its public policies. 
 
 
1.3 What are the characteristics of the agricultural sector in Japan in pre-1990s 
period? 
 
Mulgan (2003, p.268) argued that of all the economic sectors in Japan, 
agriculture has been regarded as the one where policymaking involves the closest 
adhesion among the LDP, interest groups, and ministers levels of politicization and 
the closeness of ties among the LDP, interest groups, and bureaucratic agencies. The 
three-way coalition of bureaucratic, party and producer organizations has formed an 
“iron triangle” of vested interests in agricultural support and protection (Maclachlan, 
2004). 
 
In Japan, it was always argued that the agriculture sector was even more 
internally cohesive than the business sector. One of the most important reasons for 
that was the Nokyo, a system of agricultural cooperatives, which is one of the most 
politically powerful organisations in Japanese politics. It is an economic entity that 
provides almost every kind of service to rural areas (Yoshihisa, 2001, p.17).   
 
The system of agricultural cooperative plays a pivotal role in the structure and 
economy of Japan’s agricultural sector. Although there is no legal requirement to join 
Nokyo, almost all Japanese farmers belong to the organization. It has strong ties with 
the LDP. For its support of the LDP at election time, Nokyo has been able to ensure 
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that farmers’ interests are protected.  
 
Nokyo has national, prefectural, and some the thousand local organizations whose 
members include 99 percent of the farm families in the country.  At the village level, 
cooperatives provide purchasing, marketing, and credit facilities, crop spraying, and 
equipment. They also provided sound financial support including running banks, 
insurance companies, and small credit bureaus, as well as driving schools and 
mail-order bride services. Nokyo on the other hand has a close cooperation with 
trading companies, is Japan’s seventh-largest bank and the world’s largest insurance 
company (Pempel, 1998, p.154). 
 
The strong cohesion of the agricultural sector puts pressure on the government to 
continue the mercantilism policy during the election time and the support of the 
agricultural sector did ensure the victories of the LDP. The close linkage between the 
agricultural sector and the LDP are mainly due to their interests. On one hand, the 
products of the agricultural sector are vulnerable to foreign competition and therefore 
the Nokyo is strongly against the agricultural liberalization of imports, while, on the 
other side, the LDP would like the votes of the agricultural sector so that they can 
secure their support in the elections. Therefore the relationship between the LDP and 
the agricultural sector is interdependent and based on mutual benefits.  
 
The pre-1990s socio-economic coalition was mainly formed by the business 
sector (big and small business), bureaucracy and political parties as well as the 
agricultural sector. Firms joined various trade associations to achieve the best interest 
for the bureaucrats. The close connection of the business sector can form stronger 
ways to express their ideas towards the government, especially for keeping the 
mercantilist industrial and economic policy to facilitate their exports and restrict the 
imports for competition. Furthermore, due to the close relationship between the 
bureaucrats, LDP and the business sectors through the unique structure of the “iron 
triangle”, the organized business had great influence over the LDP through donations, 
especially in times of election.   
 
Regarding the agricultural sector, most of the agricultural sector joined the Nokyo 
and since the LDP would need the agricultural sector to support’s at elections 
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therefore the interests of the agricultural sector should be protected from trade 
liberalization. 
 
Growing evidence suggested that the links between the LDP, certain interest 
groups, and the national bureaucracy had become so institutionalized as a 
consequence of the long-term rule by the LDP as to be a parallel threat. Others 
considered the likelihood that the ever-dwindling electoral support for the LDP might 
lead to a coalition government or to rule by the opposition parties.  
 
 
2. Changes in the socio-economic regime in the 1990s  
 
In the 1990s, the socio-economic structure associated with the “iron triangle” and 
the business/ agriculture linkages to the LDP came under stress. The Editor of the 
Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), Shimomiya Takashi has stated that the rules of the game in 
the “Iron Triangle” model in Japan did change in the 1990s.5 The following section 
analyses the changes which have occurred in the socio-economic regime.  
 
2.1 The changes in agricultural and business sectors in post-1990 Japan 
The strong cohesion of business and agricultural regime has changed in the 
post-1990 period. Basically, two major changes have happened in the 1990s which 
contributed to the overall regime changes. First, the agricultural sector and small 
businesses have provided substantially less support for the LDP. Second, big business 
had become more internally fragmented and not allied solidly towards support for the 
LDP. The following analysis will discuss the interrelationships between the changes 
in political regime and public policy paradigm.   
 
Agricultural and small businesses occupied different positions in the 1960s and 
the 1990s. Farmers and the small business had enjoyed extensive protection through 
measures as farm subsidies, import quotas on key agricultural goods, and low or no 
                                                 
5 Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), May 30, 2002 
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interest loans to small shopkeepers in the pre-1990 period. However, the number, 
size and economic influence of farmers and small businesses themselves continued to 
be disproportionately reduced and they were no longer as essential a factor in 
deciding the winning of seats of the LDP. Urbanization and migration from rural 
areas, especially by young people, played a role. In the 1965 election farmers made 
up of 29 percent of the total vote but this was reduced to under 10 percent by the 
2000 election (Mulgan, 2003, p.98).  Furthermore, farmers’ share in the nations’ 
total economic activity was also reduced due to the industrialization and economic 
development of Japan, which saw the economic structure place greater emphasis on 
the service sector. 
 
The trade liberalization polices of the government, which also further damaged 
the cohesion of the socio-economic coalition. In the 1990s, international pressures to 
liberalize Japan’s protectionist markets, which had begun in the 1970s, reached a 
peak. The LDP government and later on the post-1993 coalition governments were 
also quite responsive to these pressures from the United States, the European 
Community and the The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) / World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Industry, banking, distribution, and insurance sectors 
were opened one by one. Japan also came to have a lower average tariff rate than the 
United States and the European Community. Especially in the agricultural sector, 
Japan had the most liberalized market among the major industrial countries: about 70 
percent of Japan’s food supply was imported. Decontrolling the rice trade seemed a 
natural step in Japan’s overall process of liberalization (Kuo et al, 1992). 
 
The trade liberalization of the LDP governments had speeded up in the late 1980s 
and the farmers’ reduced support for the LDP could be shown in the loss of the HC 
election in July 1989, with farm support for the party falling from 56 percent in the 
1986 election to 41 percent in 1989. This was a response to the 1988 Citrus and Beef 
Understanding between Japan and the United States in which Japan had made a deal 
with the United States on trade liberalization. Similarly, by-elections for the HC in 
1992 also showed less support for the LDP from the agricultural sector (Berger, 1981; 
Kuo et al, 1992).  
 
Apart from the trade liberalization that created adverse impacts on their interests, 
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their reduction in size and economic influence also made them vulnerable and less 
influential in providing secure support for the LDP. 
 
Besides the agricultural sector, the changes in economic and industrial policy of 
Japan also resulted in changes of the structure of the business sector through the 
system of keiretsu. As mentioned, keiretsu was a unique system which linked up the 
big business and small business together. This structure could also facilitate their 
common interests and reduce the internal competition through both the vertical and 
horizontal combination.   
 
The open door policy of Japan and changes in the industrial and economy 
policies resulted in joint ventures between Japanese firms and overseas firms. 
Japanese companies formed strategic alliances with foreign-owned firms (Porter, 
1991; Burton & Saelens, 1994).  Amongst the Japanese firms that forged 
partnerships with foreign firms were Toyota and Nissan in auto manufacture; Fujitsu, 
NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba in electronics; Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) 
and International Telegram and Telephone (KDD) in telecommunications (Pempel, 
1997, p.241). All the changes in the 1990s resulted in a confusion of the “nationality” 
of the businesses. 
 
The alliances with foreign-owned firms reduce the extent of Japanese ownership 
of the companies and in that sense, they will not be so united together through the 
system of keiretsu since their interests seemed to be more diversified and they will 
then compete with each other under the same structure. The changes of the keiretsu 
reduced the leverage of the Japanese business sector and then their views were less 
cohesive and not strong enough to reflect their views to the government. Most 
importantly, they were less united to support the government to maintain the 
mercantilist policies to restrict the competition (since foreign-owned firms were 
formed in Japan). With less common interests for their sector, their support towards 
the government as well as its policies decreased. 
 
 
2.2 The division of big business in the 1990s 
Same as small business, big business had cohesively supported mercantilism in 
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the pre-1990s. However by the 1990s no such support existed amongst the business 
sector. Numerous Japanese firms stood out as highly competitive by international 
standards, particularly large manufacturers in areas such as electronics, machine tools, 
and automobiles.  
 
The mercantilism adopted by the LDP in the pre-1990s regime had maintained 
the economy of Japan as being relatively closed to the outside world. The advantages 
of the relatively closed economy were that Japanese firms could prevent themselves 
competing directly with the outside world. However, some of the Japanese firms 
were not able to compete with the outside world after the trade liberalization policy 
adopted. By the 1990 period, it was interesting that two very different types of large 
businesses existed in Japan. The first type was predominantly high-tech, 
internationally competitive, highly-profitable and relying on little or no direct 
government assistance. They were the part that was successfully established by the 
LDP government through the protection of infant industries in the post-war policies. 
 
The second type, however, were some non-competitive industries that have been 
depending on the relative insulation of the Japanese market from outside investment 
and imports, and a series of specific side-payments in the form of farm subsidies, 
import quotas on key agricultural goods, low – or no-interest loans. The high growth 
rate in Japan in the 1960s to 1980s enabled the government to provide such a large 
amount of subsidies to maintain the preferential treatments for the business sector. 
However, the economic recession of Japan in the early 1990s reduced the income of 
the government through taxation and other means. 
 
The division of the large business into two types resulted in sharp internal 
cleavages within the Japanese business community. Pempel (1998, p.311) argued that 
the socio-economic divisions of the early 1990s culminated in the actual split within 
the party in 1993. The LDP split reflected to some extent the urban-rural and 
competitive-uncompetitive division within the business sectors and the agricultural 
sector. The competition between rural and urban sector became obvious when the 
international pressure and trade liberalization forced the opening of the agricultural 
and economic and industrial markets.  In terms of the business sectors, the increases 
in joint ventures of created internal changes in the market which forced the business 
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market to change. 
 
Not only was big business becoming more diversified, but the political 
party-business relationship was being affected by another change in the rules of the 
game. From the beginning of the 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter, public 
criticism of “money politics” grew and then the LDP collapsed. The Keidanren 
reviewed its political donations, policies and, in September 1993, stopped collecting 
them from member companies. The donations dropped from a peak of 10 billion yen 
to 3 billion yen. The Keidanren moved away from using donations to secure its 
interests to publicising its favored policies and participating in government economic 
panels. 
 
The cohesion of the LDP and business sector has been further loosened in the 
new coalition government regime, because under the multi-party coalitions after1993, 
business found itself dealing with several political parties, not just the LDP as before 
1993. The reform of election law also placed additional restrictions on the 
fundraising activities of individual politicians which also greatly damaged the power 
of the LDP. The reforms attempt to channel political money into routes other than the 
traditional fundraising that resulting in the issue of “money politics” (Christensen, 
1996; Stockwin, 2003; Mulgan, 2003; Hrebenar, 2000) by restricting the amount of 
donation is restricted. The reform stipulated that each candidate is now allowed only 
one official fundraising organization. Corporations and other organizations can 
contribute only 500,000 yen in a calendar year to a politician’s official fundraising 
organization and this fundraising activity would be completely banned in the future.  
 
As a further step, in the House of Councillors elections in 1998, Keidanren 
succeeded in securing political power within the ruling coalition not by donating 
money to lawmakers, but by sending a lawmaker to the Diet to represent its interests 
e.g. during the taxation reform of 1999, the Keidanren succeeded in reducing the 
effective corporate tax rate.  This did bring an impact on the fundraising rule of the 
old regime (i.e. LDP one-party dominance regime) in the new coalition government 
regime. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, who is the president of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, even officially announced in 1999 that the “LDP has decided to 
ban political donations from business corporations and organizations to individual 
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politicians funds-management organizations next year.” 
 
2.3. The bureaucrats weakened 
As discussed above, the bureaucrats as well as various interest groups, large and 
small, played important parts in the decision-making system. However, the 
bureaucracy lost its influence and public respect during the 1990s to a certain extent. 
The public's attitude toward the elite is ambivalent. The elite enjoys tremendous 
social prestige, but its members are also resented. More and more criticisms grew 
over the practice of amakudari, as it is popularly known; bureaucrats retiring in their 
fifties often assume top positions in public corporations and private enterprise. They 
also become politicians; by the late 1980s, most postwar prime ministers had had 
civil service backgrounds. But, amakudari also incurred corruption scandals among 
the top officials and business sector, such as the Recruit affair. Together with the 
economic problems from the early 1990s, however, evidence of administrative 
failures from the previous decade had, to some extent, tarnished their image. 
 
In the 1990s, it became apparent that there were limits to the bureaucrats' power. 
As cohesion between the main anchors in the “iron triangle” were loosened, together 
with the emergence of the coalition government, the political regime became more 
fluid. As the politicians tried to use the intense rivalry amongst the parties in the 
coalition governments to their own advantage, the bureaucracy, which had become 
comfortable pre-1993 in dealing with only the LDP, now that suddenly they had to 
liaise with and assist several parties in the coalition governments that made them 
more difficult to deal with. At the same time, the changes in the business sector, 
discussed above, also made it more difficult for the bureaucrats to satisfy and control 
the demands of the various business groups and sectors. For the bureaucrats, just as 
much as for the politicians and businessmen, the rules of the game in the “iron 
triangle” in the 1990s were no longer so simple and comprehensive. 
 
To conclude, this chapter focused on the changes of the socio-economic regime 
of Japan between the pre-1990 and the post-1990s. The socio-economic regime of 
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the Japan in the pre-1990s period featured a close connection between the agriculture 
and business sector (including big and small business), bureaucrats and the LDP 
through the keiretsu and the ‘iron triangle” system. The close connection of the big 
business and small business and the agricultural sectors provided a strong support for 
the mercantilism policies that were adopted by the LDP-led government. It could be 
said the pre-1990 period of Japan was a rather closed economy with protectionist 
policies for the business sector (i.e. offering preferential conditions to the trading 
companies in Japan) and the agricultural sectors.  
 
The international environment and policy direction changed towards to trade 
liberalization in the 1990s. The connection between the agricultural sector and the 
LDP was greatly reduced due to the trade liberalization, which limited the 
preferential conditions offered to the agricultural sector, and the downgrading of the 
rural communities due to rapid urban development. Moreover, through the linkages 
of Japanese firms with foreign-owned firms, the keiretsu system was greatly 
diminished and big business itself has been divided into two communities. The close 
network of the keiretsu was reduced in Japan and many of the large firms formed 
networks with the firms owned by the foreigners. The mechanism in the 
socio-economic coalition changed. The rules of the game in the regime changed and 
more intervention by international forces occurred. 
 
Internally, the public has striven for a “clean” government and new political 
phenomenon. The new coalition government’s new election law, launched in 1994 
further loosened the cohesion of the business and agricultural sectors with the LDP. 
The unlimited “support” from the business section for the LDP in the pre-1990s has 
been guided and restricted by the new election law.  
 
For three decades overall real economic growth had been spectacular: a 10% 
average in the 1960, a 5% average in the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 1980s. 
Growth slowed markedly in the 1990s largely because of the after-effects of 
overinvestment during the late 1980s and contractionary domestic policies intended 
to wring speculative excesses from the stock and real estate markets. After the 
“bubble” burst, the Japanese economy averaged around 1% in the 1990s. 
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Government efforts to revive economic growth have met with little success and 
were further hampered first by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and then in 
2000-2001 by the slowing of the US and Asian economies.  The government of 
Koizumi Junichiro has enacted or attempted to pass (sometimes with failure) major 
privatization and foreign-investment laws intended to help stimulate Japan's dormant 
economy.  While some of these laws have been enacted, the economy has yet to 
respond, and Japan's aging population is expected to place further strain on the 
socio-economic coalition in the near future. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Public Policy Paradigm in Japan: Comparison between the pre -1990s and the 
1990s periods 
 
 
The theoretical framework suggested by Pempel (1997, 1998) argued that in 
order to assess the regime changes of a nation, the changes in public policy of a 
particular nation should be identified and so the public policy paradigm is one of the 
pillars for assessing whether a nation has regime change or not. The changes in the 
public policy paradigm in Japan could also be linked to the changes of the political 
institutions, since the changes from the LDP dominance to the LDP-led coalitions 
would be expected to cause changes in public policy. The new LDP-led coalition 
regime, which began with the splits in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 
destruction of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the subsequent establishment of a 
number of new political parties and the change of the rules of the game in the 
political system, replaced the LDP one-party dominant regime (1955-1993). But did 
the formation of the coalition governments after1993 lead to the formation of 
different public policy? In order to explore the changes in regime in Japan, it is 
essential to look into the possible changes in public policy of Japan between the 
pre-1990s and the 1990s. 
 
Since “public policy” covers a wide range of policies, for reasons of space it is 
not possible to analyse all of them and so three key policy areas are taken as 
representative for the purposes of this analysis. The three policy area chosen can help 
to indicate not just the content but also the direction of public policies in the two 
periods, which the industrial and economic policies, the socio-welfare policies and 
the foreign policies will be discussed. 
 
 
1. Public Policies in the pre-1990s period 
 
1.1 Industrial and economic policies in the pre-1990s period 
The postwar fast economic growth of Japan was mainly guided by the managed 
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economic policy of the Japanese government and the close cohesion of the anchors in 
the “Iron Triangle”; it was not totally dependent on the resilience of the market 
economy. At that period of time, LDP was the ruling party and most of the industrial 
and economic policy followed in the direction of fast economic development. In 
evaluating Japan’s economic success, many scholars, such as Johnson and Katz see 
Japan as embodying a state-guided capitalist developmental system in which MITI 
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and industrial and economic policy 
have played a central role. In this view, government leadership has been the key to 
Japan’s economic success, with business a willing follower. Through this 40-year 
period of economic prosperity, the power of the LDP has remained strong. 
 
Tilton (1996, p.285) mentioned that the state had successfully boosted Japan’s 
economic growth by implementing industrial and economic policies to direct the 
economy toward high growth sectors. The principal functions of the industrial policy 
were allocating resources to favored sectors. It can do so through policies 
(non-market forces) that directly provided resources to industry, such as tax breaks, 
loans, subsidies, and import protection. These sorts of industrial and economic 
policies could help speed up the economic development of Japan and help the ruling 
party LDP to maintain social stability in the LDP-dominant regime. 
 
Japan in the pre-1990s was a deformed “dual economy” unique in the industrial 
world. Dual economy captures the way in which a set of coalitional and institutional 
structures entrenched a form of political capitalism at home while pursuing a 
relentlessly internationalist strategy aboard and the formation of dual economy relied 
on a series of trade-offs and compensation for the domestic sector, thereby creating a 
kind of dualist economy (Jayasuriya, 2003, p.339).  
 
Some other scholars such as Ozawa, Bai and Pempel have also examined the 
economic structure and the subsequent industrial policy of Japan in the pre-1990 
decades. Ozawa (2001a, p.489) argued that Japan was once successful in nurturing 
dynamic comparative advantages and climbing up the ladder of industrial upgrading, 
while Bai (1997, p.176) had a similar interpretation on Japan’s economy 
development and public policy; he mentioned that “the Japanese state restrained 
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market competition in strategic industries through intensive government regulations. 
To nurture the competitiveness of Japanese companies in strategic industries, the 
state continued to restrain imports of foreign exchange” (Pempel, 1997, p.332). 
Spruce (1994, p.118) also stated that under the influence of the United States, 
Japan “translated into zero-sum mercantilism where exports are pursued with a 
near-military, societal totality and any unwanted imports discouraged by all possible 
means” and “exports were approached through societal organised predatory trading 
practices, including dumping, direct and indirect subsidies, market collusion, and the 
planned destruction of entire foreign national industries, all connected with 
nationally organised technological leap-frogging”. 
Pempel (1997; 1998) has more detailed explanations on the term of 
mercantilism. He argued that mercantilism seeks to advance the macroeconomic 
interests of a nation-state through catch-up policies involving the protection and 
nurturance of domestic industries. Japan’s mercantilism was different from the more 
internationally pervasive doctrines of laissez-faire and economic liberalism. It is a 
form of government that treasures the small intervention by the government and that 
any intervention would harm the economic development and result in inefficiency of 
resource allocation. The protective industrial and economic policies of Japan, as well 
as their policy devices, such as import restriction or the allocation of foreign currency, 
were the characteristics of Japanese capitalism. This strengthened its international 
competitive power for high economic growth and kept foreign intervention out of 
Japan under the LDP ruling in the pre-1990s (Makoto, 1999). Most importantly, 
under the mechanism was further strengthened the cohesion between the LDP, 
business sectors as well as the agriculture sector. By providing a favourable 
environment for development, these interest groups in return provided funding, 
blocks of loyal voters and local organizational networks for the LDP to ensure 
victory in every election. 
 
Based on the explanations of the scholars on the industrial and economic policy 
of Japan in the pre-1990s period, the LDP government implemented five main 
policies which consisted of the following important aspects.  
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First, the promotion of export trade in high-value-added and internationally 
competitive environment resulted in a relatively successful exporting industry which 
largely benefited telecommunications, banking, finance, construction and real estate 
industries etc. While at the same time, restricting imports to protect some of Japan’s 
strategically important industries or infant industries (those industries which had 
potential and are important for the future development) including automobile, 
electronics and computer in order to protect them and keep them away from the 
international competition before the industries have been developed as competitive 
as the outside world. Second, policies on promoting exports included special 
deprecation allowances to promote investment in designated machinery by 
designated industries, permitted a firm with rising exports to claim a special 
depreciation equal to the product of the increase in its export / sales ratio etc. For 
some key exporting industries, like steel, the subsidy was huge, in some years in the 
pre-1990s amounting to as much as 25 percent of profits (Katz, 1998, p.49). A host of 
other export incentives were also offered, such as special tax deductions, exemption 
from anti-cartel provisions, lower borrowing rates and special tax status from firms 
with substantial increases in exports, tax deferments, and in some cases overt 
subsidization (Katz, 1998; Kosai, 1998; Tsuruta, T, 1998; Itoh et al, 1998; Tilton, 
1996; Yoshimatsu, 2000; Uriu, 1996).  
 
Moreover, thirdly, the LDP government set up of import quotas for restricting 
imports into Japan. A HKSBC report (1989) mentioned that until the early 1960s, 
anyone wishing to import had to seek foreign exchange from MITI and all 
commercial items imported into Japan were automatically approved if they are not 
subject to import quotas and if they carried a value of less then 5 million yen or its 
equivalent in foreign currencies. For items subject to the import quota system, 
importers must apply to MITI for an “import allocation certificate” which was 
specified in MITI’s import trade control order notices. All Japanese industrial 
policies have been designed, implemented, and justified by the MITI. MITI has been 
quick to argue market failure, so-called excessive competition, and hence seek for 
government intervention. This situation existed until the early 1990s. Fourth, the 
government also controlled the foreign exchange market. Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL) and the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) 
provided a framework which controlled foreign exchange transactions until the end 
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of 1980s. The regulatory framework included the imposition of a strict quota system 
over the allocation of foreign currency used for imports. The FEFTCL based on 
“negative principle” whereby all foreign exchange transactions were effectively 
prohibited, except for those explicitly allowed by the government. Fifth, the 
government also posted restrictions on establishing foreign-owned subsidiaries in 
order to protect the mechanism and avoid the influence from international market. 
Encarnation (1992, p.184) mentioned that only a small number of foreign-owned 
subsidiaries were approved in Japan during the 1950s and early 1960s. Accordingly, 
during the 1950s Japan was a less popular host for the U.S. foreign investment than 
any other industrialized country. Furthermore, under the foreign investment law of 
1950, all instances of inward and outward foreign direct investment, including 
technology licensing agreements, that is the purchase of patients rights or know-how, 
required not only a license issued by the MOF, but also the approval of the newly 
created Foreign Investment Bureau of MITI. Under the LDP dominant regime upto 
the pre-1990s, permission for foreigners to acquire or set up production facilities or 
subsidiaries in Japan proved more difficult to obtain than permission to enter 
technology agreements (Mason, 1992; Flath, 2000). All the above policies aimed to 
keep all domestic industries and business sectors protected in a closed economy. 
 
Under the LDP hegemony, the interesting thing is that if Japan was to really act 
in its own self-interest, considering the welfare costs imposed on the country as a 
whole, it would open its borders to trade. Such a move would, in the long run, 
increase Japan’s domestic welfare, and the welfare of all of its trade partners. 
However, the politicians were bowing to the wishes of powerful special interest 
groups – such as the rice farmers - and refused to liberalized. The pre-1990 economic 
and industrial policies which were mainly led by the idea of mercantilism; it can be 
believed that Japan’s stubborn stance ultimately seemed to be more political than 
economic in the LDP dominant regime.  
 
When one takes a good look at the statistics presented in the thesis, it should be 
quite clear that trade liberalization is a good policy. However, as rice farmers provide 
votes and Japanese politicians depend on these votes for their survival, although they 
did make a few minor compromises, the Japan continued to refuse to reduce its trade 
restrictions. The price of rice is much lower from international trade, at the peak of 
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such protectionist policies in 1985, Japan records that imports of rice from the US 
barely totaled 0.2% of total domestic consumption which Japanese suffered from the 
high price of rice. In fact, until very recently, Japan has been closed to virtually all 
rice imports. Agriculture, a lagging, not a leading growth sector, also received special 
help and almost all government subsidy payments go to agriculture, not industry until 
early 1990s. As discussed, the LDP got significant support from business sector and 
farmers in the election, by implementing these policies; definitely, it was favorable 
for the LDP to keep its close cohesion with and influence to the business sectors as 
well as the agriculture sector.  
This was a major factor in the breakdown of negotiations (Azuma, 2001, p.241). 
Because of financial support from corporations, business interest groups and 
agricultural section were generally more independent of political parties than other 
groups. Both Keidanren and the Keizai Doyu Kai, for example, indicated a 
willingness to talk with the socialists in the wake of the political scandals of 1988-89 
and also suggested that the LDP might form a coalition government with an 
opposition party in the LDP-led coalition. Yet through these organizations they and 
other top business groups provided the LDP with its largest source of party funding 
and vote support. 
 
1.2 Social and Welfare policy in the pre-1990 period 
The welfare expansion during the first ten years after 1945 was limited. Under 
LDP ruling, the characteristics are pro-business and anti-welfare direction, it was 
commonly found that the post war Japan allocated most of its resources in 
developing its economy. Therefore, during this period, much of the national effort 
was focused on social and economic reconstruction. Although a number of welfare 
measures were introduced, most of them were reforms of similar policies which had 
existed before the end of the war, and all of them were aimed at establishing a 
minimum level of livelihood for people and particularly disadvantaged groups of 
people such as children, lone mother families and the disabled (Peng, 2000, p.87). 
However, even though social and welfare policies are important for the protection of 
needy in the society, they were not the priority of the LDP government which the 
government expenditure on welfare service still kept at low level.  
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Throughout the 1980s, LDP government sought to reduce the budget deficits by 
re-establishing the “Japanese-style welfare society”. The policy aim of completing 
the construction of a western-style welfare state was now criticized as having been 
misguided, and the new theme emphasized reactivation of the “traditional” family 
and community ties.  
 
A variety of welfare reforms were introduced to encourage individual self-help 
and family mutual support, and to cut public welfare expenditure. For example, free 
health care services for the elderly (Elderly Health Care Programme) were eliminated 
in 1982, and replaced by a new surcharge system. The Health Insurance and Pension 
schemes also went through a series of reforms during the 1980s. These resulted in 
substantial increases in individual contribution rates and, in the case of the pensions, 
also a raise in pension age from 60 to 65. As wages were linked with the years of 
service or age, Japan’s age-wage profile was steeper than in the U.S. or U.K. Because 
of the human capital formation, MPL can be raised through extensive training and 
experience. This social and welfare policy arrangement definitely contributes to 
economic development. 
 
In the area of Public Assistance and the Child-rearing Allowances for Lone 
Mother Families, the eligibility criteria were substantially tightened to “weed out 
welfare frauds” and to strengthen individual self-sufficiency and the family's welfare 
obligation (Peng 1997b, p.61).  
 
By 1992 the total number of recipients of Public Assistance was reduced to 
two-thirds of the 1980 level, from 1.42 million to 930,000 people (Ono, 1997, p.83). 
The number of lone mother families receiving the Childrearing Allowance also 
dropped by 10 per cent from 647,606 to 588,782 between 1985 and 1990, while the 
proportion of those receiving Public Assistance fell by 50 per cent during the same 
period. On the other hand, a series of tax reforms were introduced to enable 
“traditional” two- and three-generation households to take on a greater share of 
welfare responsibilities. A special tax break for a housewife's part-time income was 
introduced in the same year allowing married women to earn up to yen1 million a 
year tax-free. A new tax credit for families co-residing with elderly parents was also 
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introduced in 1984, along with a significant tax break for families purchasing houses 
built for three-generation co-residency or for home renovations for the purpose of 
accommodating elderly family members. Finally, a number of other tax benefits for 
families caring for elderly relatives were also introduced during this time. It is not 
difficult to see that all these policies were aimed at strengthening the traditional 
family arrangements and reasserting the welfare responsibilities of the individual and 
the family and most important which helped to minimize the government and public 
burden regarding to the serious aging problem in Japan (Ono, 1997, p.62).  
 
To conclude, in the pre-1990 period, the Japanese governmental budget for social 
welfare allocation was limited and was quite a different pattern from the one 
emerging in Europe especially in high-welfare countries like Sweden. The LDP 
government had long avoided sweeping and costly nationwide programs in health 
care, retirement benefits, or other social welfare measures. The government only 
provided a “safety net” that maintaining a low level of benefits for those in need.  
 
 
1.3 Foreign policies in the pre-1990 period 
Defense, security, and foreign policy have always been critical elements of 
Japan’s political economy and had been closely linked with the ruling government. It 
is noted that Japan in the post WWII era has been characterized by more international 
passivity, especially the post WWII era in which the foreign policies of the LDP 
government were very close to the policies and interests of the United States. The 
LDP targeted the economic prosperity of Japan as the main nation goal and so its 
foreign policies were designed to achieve that goal.   
 
Given the overriding importance of economic factors in foreign relations, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked closely with the Ministry of Finance on matters 
of customs, tariffs, international finance, and foreign aid; with the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) on exports and imports; and with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries on questions of foreign agricultural 
imports and fishing rights. Yet as the postwar generation of leaders and policymakers 
began to assume a greater role in government decision making and as public attitudes 
on foreign policy issues matured, there were indications that foreign affairs were 
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being conducted on the basis of a more stable consensus. 
 
As is well-known, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was closely 
associated with the conservative, pro-United States position, while opposition parties 
often staked out positions at odds with the status quo. Japan's foreign policy goals 
during most of the pre-1990s period were essentially to regain economic viability 
and establish its credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. During 
the pre-1990s, foreign policy actions were guided by two basic principles: close 
cooperation with the United States for both security and economic reasons; and 
international cooperation through the United Nations (UN). Adherence to these 
principles worked well and contributed to phenomenal economic recovery and 
growth during the first two decades after the end of the occupation. National security 
was entrusted to the protective shield and nuclear umbrella of the United States. The 
LDP had brought together various candidates and their supporting interest groups 
and had reached a policy consensus to pursue economic development while 
depending strongly on the United States security umbrella. 
 
There was no doubt that Japan relied on the military security of the United 
States, especially in the early years of the LDP government in which Japan was 
closely linked with the United States through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which 
provided the broad pattern of the military and security ties between the two countries. 
Bowen (1992, p.57) stated that “since the war Japan’s defense alliance with the 
United States has had an enormous impact on foreign policy, both inhibiting and 
aiding Japan’s relations with other states.”  
 
Katzenstein (1996, p.21) stated that the US-Japan Security Treaty provided the 
broad definitions of military and security ties between the two countries with few 
significant changes since its ratification in 1960. The closeness between the two 
countries in the LDP dominant regime was reflected in the continuation of U.S. bases 
on Japanese soil, institutional links between the two countries’ militaries, joint 
military exercises, technology-sharing and co-production agreements, extensive 
intelligence exchanges, and others. The relationship between them was so close that 
they have been viewed as a “marriage” with each other (Frost, 1987; Shindo, 1989). 
Some scholars, nonetheless, argued that the Americans routinely labelled Japan an 
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“international free rider”. American spent 5-6 percent of its GNP on maintaining its 
military supremacy, while Japan, committed to nonaggression formalized by its 
“peace constitution” and protected by the United States-Japan security treaty – 
limited its military spending about 1 percent of GNP (Islam, 1993, p.62).  
 
Besides Japan’s pro-US approach, the foreign policy of Japan in the pre-1990 
displayed on unwillingness to take a more active leadership on a variety of 
international problems or engaging in international issues, since most of the 
resources were placed on the economic development. In the pre-1990s, Japan had 
low posture in international relations because most of the energy and time were spent 
on the economic development through promoting the export aggressively (Pempel, 
1997; 1998). Moreover, because of the unwillingness to take an active role in 
international affairs, until the 1980s Japan had no significant foreign aid programme 
and even then, most of the programmes had been focused on aid to Asia. The pro-US 
stance of the LDP government was characterized by its conservative nature after the 
WWII and she was not active in uplifting her international status. Most of her foreign 
policies just closely followed the direction of the US.  
 
Nationally, political challenges to the LDP dominance waxed and waned later in 
the 1980s as the party faced major influence-peddling scandals with weak and 
divided leadership. In 1989 the opposition Japan Socialist Party won control of the 
Diet's House of Councillors. But the Japan Socialist Party's past ideological positions 
on foreign policy appeared to be more of a liability than an asset going into the HR 
elections in 1990, and the party attempted to modify a number of positions that called 
for pushing foreign policy to the left. In contrast, the LDP standard bearer, Prime 
Minister Kaifu Toshiki, used identification with the United States and the West to his 
advantage in the successful LDP effort to sustain control of the HR in February 1990. 
It revealed that there was great support among the public to the pro-US approach of 
the Japanese foreign policy, which the LDP definitely could claim credit due to its 
solid close relationship with the U.S..  
 
On economic front, a specific example of Japan's close cooperation with the 
United States included its quick response to the United States call for greater host 
nation support from Japan following the rapid realignment of Japan-United States 
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currencies in the mid-1980s. The currency realignment resulted in a rapid rise of 
United States costs in Japan, which the Japanese government, upon United States 
request, was willing to offset.  
 
Diplomatically, another set of examples was provided by the LDP government's 
willingness to respond to United States requests for foreign assistance to countries 
considered of strategic importance to the West. Japan's response to the United States 
decision to help to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-88). During the 1980s, United States officials voiced appreciation for Japan's 
"strategic aid" to countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jamaica. Prime 
Minister Kaifu Toshiki's pledges of support for East European and Middle Eastern 
countries in 1990 fit the pattern of Japan's willingness to share greater responsibility 
for world stability. Japan's leaders welcomed the reassertion of United States military 
power. We can see the LDP government devoted their full support to the United State, 
in the Asian and world affairs following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the United 
States hostage crisis, and the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, all of which 
occurred in late 1980s.  
 
To conclude, the three most important public policies of Japan had been 
discussed beforehand, including the industrial and economic policies, social and 
welfare policies as well as the foreign policies. It was noted that the pre-1990 period 
was dominated by the LDP and at that period of time, most of the resources had been 
allocated for developing the economic situation of Japan and the close cohesion 
between political party, business sector and bureaucracy made Japan became strong 
again in economics. That is why in the pre-1990 period, the Japanese government 
strongly promoted the export of products but on the other side, restricting imports 
from other nations in order to prevent the negative impacts on the exports of the 
domestic industries. Furthermore, due to most of the resources being allocated to the 
economic development, it was common sense that resources allocated for the social 
welfare policies should be limited. By the same token, the social and welfare policies 
were also developed in line with the policy direction of the LDP. Last but not least, 
the foreign policies were very close to America, to large extent, all these major 
policies were guided by the political monopoly – the LDP in the one-party 
dominance regime. 
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2. Regime Change: Public Policies in the 1990 period 
 
2.1 Industrial and economic policies in the 1990 period 
After achieving one of the highest economic growth rates in the world from the 
1960s through the 1980s, the Japanese economy slowed dramatically in the early 
1990s, when the "bubble economy" collapsed. The economic stagnancy uprooted the 
LDP hegemonic dynasty and led to its replacement by a new multiparty system, 
which also caused a shift of public policy direction in Japan. Over the 1990s decade 
Japanese public policies have changes significantly, the differences and contrasts 
between the pre-1990s and the 1990s were clear in the public policy paradigm. From 
the policies changed in the 1990s, evidences were found to present that the industrial 
and economic policies, social and welfare policies as well as the foreign policies 
have been altered. The more from LDP dominance to LDP-led coalitions changed all 
the three types of policies, as will be argued in the following sections.  
 
The mercantilism policy adopted by the LDP government in the pre-1990 period 
involved macroeconomic policies that were carried out in the approximately the first 
twenty-five years after WWII, resting on “developmentalist” catch-up. These policies 
basically included extensive economic planning; industrial organization; protection 
of domestic manufacturers, financial institutions and agricultural settings; limits on 
foreign penetration of Japanese markets as well as on Japanese firms moving aboard, 
which in return devoted their full support to the LDP’s ruling in the LDP one-party 
dominant regime. (Encarnation, 1992; Kosai, 1988; Tsuruta, 1988; Itoh et al., 1988; 
Yoshimatsu, 2000; Tilton, 1996; Trevor, 2001; Flath, 2000; Katz, 1998). 
 
The policy tools serving these goals were many: high tariffs, and restrictive 
quotas on most manufactured imports, tight control over domestic consumption, 
restrictions on capital and technology flows into and out of Japan, a systematically 
undervalued yen that made Japanese exports cheap in world markets, a very 
restricted bond market, policies to encourage high personal savings by citizens, and a 
strong reliance on foreign technology purchases. Together with the close relationship 
of the anchors in the “Iron triangle” and the high consensus in the society, this made 
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Japan be the economic giant in the world. 
 
However, the industrial and economic polices have changed much by the 
mid-1990s. Lincoln (1988) and Pempel (1998) stated that in the 1990s, Japan’s 
capital markets and its currency had become deeply integrated into world markets 
and the influence of the government on the public policies decreased mainly because 
the adoption of liberalization in the 1990s. One of the most important changes in 
policy environment is that government is no longer dominated by the LDP, but an 
allied coalition. As discussed, “Iron Triangle” formed a powerful cohesion between 
the LDP, business sectors, bureaucracy as well as agriculture sector in the LDP 
dominance regime. However, this cohesion changed in the 1990s with the great 
pressure from the public to strive for “clean government”. This change of 
relationship among the anchors in the “Iron Triangle” together with the changes in 
economic environment, the new coalition government’s ruling have affected 
substantially the goals, policy instruments, and policy environment in Japan. 
Following the complaints, the US and other countries began to put heavy pressure on 
Japan to open its market. Although slow to respond initially, due to these rules of 
game changed, Japan has begun to liberalize its market.   
 
First, the Japanese government adopted the appreciation of the Japanese yen. It 
was fixed at 360 to the U.S. dollar from 1947 until 1971, but then went from 145 by 
mid-1998 to around 120 to one dollar in 2001 (Business Times, 21 August 2001). It 
was noted that the appreciation of yen was due to the less government control over 
monetary policy. Second, revised of the Foreign Exchange and Control Law (1980) 
and the deregulation of the corporate market, which meant that by the mid-1990s, 
individual Japanese were free to issue bonds abroad in whatever was the most 
suitable currency and the swap the proceeds into yen. And by 1996, cumulative 
Japanese investment abroad totaled nearly $500 billion, making Japan the world’s 
second-largest overseas investor. Japan definitely benefited from the active 
involvement in international business activities which also helped Japan to recover 
from the recession.  
 
Third, Japan becomes more international in production and global investment 
strategies. By the mid and late 1990s large number of Japanese manufacturing firms 
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were basing in their activities less on production in and export from Japan and far 
more on truly international production and global investment strategies. The 
Japanese offshore market grew from nearly nothing in 1985 to almost half a trillion 
dollars in 1991. Even though there were signs of decline during economic recession, 
the affiliates were still in a relatively large increase comparing with the pre-1990 
period of time. Third, the government also carried out reducing tariff and trade 
barriers. Pressures from the United States and the Europeans focused on Japanese 
reductions of tariff barriers, import quotas, and various non-tariff barriers. The 
United States and other European countries’ pressure became increasingly sector 
specific to reduce the trade deficit between nations and lead on voluntary export 
agreements, with France being particularly successful in gaining Japanese consent to 
restrict exports in colour televisions, cars, light commercial vehicles, motorcycles etc. 
and even accept a voluntary export restraint (VER) (McCraw, 1990, p.58). Last but 
not the least, the Japanese government also increased forming strategic alliances. 
Many Japanese firms, including many subcontractors, added to their multinational 
character by forging strategic alliances with foreign-owned firms. In the 1990s, Japan 
employed both market and non-market strategies to form alliances with 
foreign-owned firms. Burton and Saelens (1994, p.73) stated that amongst the 
Japanese firms that forged partnership with foreign firms were Toyota and Nissan in 
auto manufacture; Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba in electronics; Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and International Telegram and Telephone (KDD) in 
telecommunications and etc. The joint ownership of the firms undermined the 
mercantilist orientations that the Japanese companies should be protected by 
restricting cooperation and competition with the external markets and also often the 
ties to the keiretsu and also reduced the level of government in manipulating the 
industrial and economic policies of Japan. Most importantly, liberalization brought 
large pressure on the cohesion of the LDP and interest groups, which final lead to the 
change of “Iron Triangle”. 
 
As mentioned, votes from agriculture sector was very critical for the LDP in the 
election. It is interesting to see the situation of agriculture sector after the 
liberalization in the LDP-led coalition regime. 
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In 2000 consumers spent over 1% of their income ($638 per individual) to cover 
the merely the difference between domestic and world rice prices. This problem 
directly affects an individual when he/she goes shopping at the local market. Data 
shows that Japanese consumers pay roughly $2.63 per kilogram compared to the US 
price of $.20 per kilogram (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [MAFF], 2001). 
Other welfare losses are shouldered by the government, which then taxes consumers 
and imposes further welfare losses. One example of such expenditures is storage 
costs. As indicated previously, the government has agreed to pay the difference to 
producers when the domestic price falls below a predetermined standard. It 
accomplishes this by buying surplus rice stocks at the predetermined price. The 
government has then chosen to store the rice rather than export it, and this then 
requires increased taxes to provide for the storage facilities. 
Through the liberalization, the changes in industrial and economic policies 
especially in the rice sectors could be categorized in the following aspects.  
In the 1990s, Japan has been gradually reducing trade barriers. (United States 
Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2002). Figure 1 illustrates a few of these effects. 
Note that when consumption exceeds production, storage volumes and the associated 
expenses increase. Also interesting to note is the import level of nearly zero until 
1993. The lack of imports can be taken as evidence of the welfare loss experienced 
by consumers. 
 
 
 When the specific data is considered, Japan is one of the highest cost rice 
producers in the world; on the other hand, other countries, such as Burma enjoy some 
of the lowest production costs, (Yap, 1991). In the event that the trade between the 
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two countries was to be completely liberalized, Japanese consumers would likewise 
benefit from the liberalization through the increased supply and subsequent decline 
in prices. From the above table, we can note that in the pre-1990 import of near no 
rice imported from abroad due to the mercantilism and protective policy adopted by 
the LDP government. Under liberalization, rice has been imported since 1990s due to 
the great international pressure. No doubt that Japanese rice farmers are facing a 
great challenge which have ever met before. Agriculture liberalization further loosens 
the cohesion of the LDP and farmers in the new regime. By-elections for the HC in 
1992 also showed less support for the LDP from the agricultural sector (Berger, 1981; 
Kuo et al, 1992).  
 
The above characteristics are some major elements of changes in industrial and 
economic policies of Japan in the post-1990 period due to the change of the 
economic environment and political regime. Besides, Frieden (1993), Thorn (1987) 
& Turner (1991) stated that Japan has come to dominate international money and 
financial markets, and international conditions have become extremely important to 
many Japanese firms. Japan’s rise to predominance has been almost as rapid as that 
of the United States during and after WWI. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
figures were 20 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI), 25 percent of equities, 55 
percent of bonds, and 50 percent of short-term bank outflows compared with only 2 – 
15 percent of above sessions in the 1960 and the late 1970s. Temporary difficulties in 
the 1990s did slow this process, but they were unlikely to alter the overall trend; 
Japan’s role in Pacific financial and investment flows was extremely large and likely 
to grow larger which Japan being much more pro-active in the international market.  
 
Also, the process has made major Japanese banks and firms far more integrated 
into the international financial system. Japanese financial investors and 
intermediaries had enormous overseas positions; as of 1991, the international assets 
of Japanese banks were $1.9 trillion, one-third of total international bank assets 
(Bank of International Settlements, 1991). The integration of Japan into international 
financial system reduced the cohesion of the keiretsu and therefore individual 
Japanese companies and financial institutions in the mid and late 1990s, free to issue 
bonds abroad in whatever was the most suitable currency and then swap the proceeds 
into yen. Their dependence on financing from home-based banks diminished sharply 
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(Pempel, 1997, p.211).  
 
The above changes in the industrial and economic policies in Japan in the 1990s 
period were evidence that Japan could be regarded as undergoing a change from a 
mercantilism to an open market economy. The changes in industrial and economic 
policy were partially due to the pressure from the international marketing, but also 
because of the gradual decline of the LDP dominance in the political regime in Japan 
in the LDP-led coalition regime. But, as public policies were formed due to the 
decision-making process of the government, we can find although the LDP’s power 
has been eroded in the LDP-led coalition government, it still exert its influence to 
protect their old partner – rice farmer by issuing enormous subsidies to them. 
However, the cohesion of the LDP, business sector and agriculture sector has been 
greatly damaged after the liberalization. The LDP lost much of the farmers’ vote in 
1993’s election which forced the LDP to form the coalition alliance to regain it 
power to the Diet in the new regime. 
 
 
2.2 Social and welfare policies in the1990 period 
In the pre-1990 period, the pattern of welfare development in Japan suggests a 
case of retrenchment and most of the resources have been allocated in the economic 
restructuring and development due to the LDP priority in economic development. 
However, in the 1990s we see quite a different shift. With the collapse of the Bubble 
Economy in 1989, it would seem that the predictable thing for the government to do 
was to consider strengthening the social welfare service in Japan.  
 
In the 1990s the call for the Japanese-style welfare society had all but 
disappeared, and the notion of welfare expansion had re-emerged as an important 
policy priority. Indeed, government report after report emphasized the urgent need to 
rethink the welfare system and to reinvest in welfare infrastructure. One immediate 
outcome of this has been a steady rise in social security expenditure to run a large 
scale care- based social welfare program in order to comfort the public anxiety 
caused by economic downturn and to gain public support. The post-1993 coalition 
government tried its very best to solve and mend the anti-welfare discussion failure 
made by pre-1993 LDP government. Although LDP-led government came back to 
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power in 1996, the direction of the social welfare policy did not changed much. 
Currently the total social security expenditure in Japan accounts for approximately 
one-third of government expenditure.  
 
In fact, by the mid-1990s, social security had become one of the largest items of 
the government expenditure and one of the fastest-growing sectors in Japan due to 
the change of the LDP dominance to a multi-party system. The coalition government 
started to the total national budget expenditure (i.e. all expenditure other than those 
for serving national debt and the allocation of tax grant to the local governments). In 
1996 it accounted for 14.3 billion yen out of 75 billion yen. Social insurance is the 
largest item within the social security expenditure--it accounted for yen 8.5 billion or 
60 per cent of the total social security expenditure--while personal social welfare 
services accounted for about yen3.8 billion or 27 per cent of the total. The national 
budget in Japan is relatively small. Government expenditures have been less than 10 
per cent of the GDP since the beginning of the 1980s. In 1996 the ratio of general 
government expenditure to GDP was 8.7 per cent (Japan Ministry of Finance, 1997). 
 
Reviews of the social security system in 1989, 1994 and 1995 have led to a 
number of new policies and legislation aimed at redesigning the Japanese welfare 
system. Particularly, significant changes were made in the areas of elder care and 
child welfare. These changes have brought about not only a new consensus about an 
increased state role in welfare provision, but also a substantial shift in the nature of 
social welfare itself.  
 
Before the 1980s social welfare in Japan was largely regarded as serving the 
function of poverty relief: that is, that part of social welfare other than social 
insurance was mainly focused on cash-based public assistance and related activities 
reserved for a relatively small group of people, such as the elderly, the disabled and 
lone mother families. However, recent shifts suggest an attempt to make social 
welfare more universal, and at the same time to shift its focus from cash-based 
assistance to care-based social services. The social welfare trajectory in the 1990s 
seems to reflect this new direction.  
 
Currently the two main loci of social welfare in Japan are the Chronic Care 
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Insurance and child care reform. The services paid for by the insurance include: a 
variety of domiciliary care such as home help, bathing, visiting nurse, rehabilitation; 
the cost of equipment for domiciliary care such as wheelchairs and special bathroom 
equipment; the cost of approved home repairs and renovations; high levels of care for 
those with higher degrees of disability; and the cost of institutional care for those 
living in institutions. The scheme will operate as a mandatory public social insurance, 
the cost of which will be borne by all citizens over the age of 40. For those who are 
between the ages of 40 and 64 the insurance fee will be simply added on to the 
existing health insurance, while for those over the age of 65. 
 
In terms of child welfare a similar shift towards an increased state and market 
role in the provision of care can be seen. A new child care policy was introduced in 
1994 as a part of a larger child welfare reform known as the Angel Plan. Its aims are 
to provide a wide range of support to families with children, and to create a positive 
environment for families to have more children. This policy so far has led to an 
expansion in a number of public childcare services. Over the last few years some 
local governments have become more lenient in their day-care needs assessment for 
publicly funded day-care spaces.  
 
Besides Chronic Care Insurance and child care reform that was established in the 
post 1990 period, the long-term care insurance (LTCI) has been implemented, with 
the exception that the premium payments by the insured started six month later. The 
Long-term care insurance is the first comprehensive policy instrument to tackle the 
problems of the ageing population. The estimated number of the aged who need 
LTCI was 2.8 million (Aspalter & Lai, 2003).  
 
It is important to point out here, however, that although significant, these changes 
by no means indicate that the Japanese state has now replaced the family or the 
corporate sector in providing social welfare, it was just a symbol of the changes of 
the needs of the society as well as changes in policy making of a LDP-led coalition 
government.  Indeed, while the changes are significant, the fact is that the level of 
the state provision before this was so low that even with the most optimistic level of 
increase it will still be a while before the Japanese welfare state will reach the level 
of many of the European ones in terms of service provision. 
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2.3 Foreign policies in the 1990 period 
In the LDP-led regime since 1993, it appears clear to observers in Japan that the 
majority of the Japanese public and elite are satisfied with the general direction of 
Japan's foreign policy. That policy direction is characterized by continued close ties 
with the United States to sustain world stability and prosperity that are so beneficial 
to Japan, and incrementally more assertive Japanese policies, especially regarding 
international economic and political institutions and Asian affairs. Beyond its 
immediate neighbors, the LDP-led coalition government has also pursued a more 
active foreign policy in recent years, recognizing the responsibility that accompanies 
its economic strength. It has expanded ties with the Middle East, which provides 
most of its oil. Japan increasingly is active in Africa and Latin America and has 
extended significant support to development projects in both regions.  
 
It is noted that Japanese security policy has been largely passive and reactive in 
recognition of Japan’s deference toward the United States due to the close 
relationship of the LDP and the United States in the pre-1990 LDP one-party 
dominant regime. As the armed forces (Self-Defense Forces) were constrained by 
ideology and legal and political frameworks, Japan has relied heavily on economic 
levers, such as investment and financial aid, to exercise influence abroad. 
 
After several decades as long-standing military allies and increasingly 
interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States cooperated closely to 
build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in 
world stability and development. These two societies and economies became 
increasingly intertwined. On the economic front, in the 1990s their combined gross 
national product totaled about one third of the world's GNP. Japan received about 11 
percent of United States exports (a larger share than any other country except 
Canada), and the United States bought about 34 percent of Japan's exports. Japan had 
US$148 billion in direct investment in the United States in 1991, while the United 
States had more than US$17 billion invested in Japan. Some US$100 billion in 
United States government securities held by institutions in Japan helped finance 
much of the United States budget deficit. Economic exchanges were reinforced by a 
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variety of scientific, technical, tourist, and other exchanges. Each society continued 
to see the other as its main ally in Asia and the Pacific. Certain developments in the 
late 1980s damaged bilateral relations. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys 
continued to reveal that substantial majorities of Japanese and Americans believed 
that the bilateral relationship was vital to both countries. The importance regarding to 
the close relationship with the United States definitely cannot be undermined.  
 
In the domestic political system, from the lesson of the 1990’s HR election as 
mentioned in the previous section, in 1993 although the coalition government 
overthrow the LDP one party dominance government, Prime Minister Hosokawa 
Morihiro pledged to continue the LDP policy of economic and security ties with the 
United States; of responding to domestic and international expectations of greater 
Japanese political and economic contributions; and of international cooperation 
through the UN and other international organizations in the cause of world peace, 
disarmament, aid to developing countries, and educational and technical cooperation. 
Foreign policy speeches by the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs 
were widely disseminated, which the new government continued to follow the 
existing pro-US approach and no great changes in the pro-US approach when 
compared with the LDP-one party dominance regime in term of the foreign policy.  
 
Also, in the LDP-lead coalition regime which the strong pro-US stance of the 
LDP is still existed in Japan in terms of its foreign policy direction, but definitely the 
LDP-led government would work towards a direction which can satisfy the political 
aspiration of various parties, especially the JSP which has a relatively strong in 
socialist background. Therefore the minor shift in her stance in foreign policies were 
proved to exist in the LDP-led government, partially due to the fact that the LDP-led 
coalitions had less autonomy, meaning that the coalition government is led by the 
LDP, but not dominated by the LDP. 
 
The nation's phenomenal economic growth had made it a ranking world 
economic power and had generated a sense of pride and self-esteem, especially 
among the younger generation. Moreover, after the long recession the LDP-led 
government also strived for a more internationalism foreign policy in order to fasten 
the economic recovery of Japan as soon as possible. In the LDP-led coalition regime, 
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government not only adopted pro-US approach, in this new regime also it also 
strived for internationalism with more independence from the United States. Japan 
has expressed greater interest in global recognition of Japan as a major power. 
Moreover, to adopt more internationalism also it is very important for the LDP to 
gain more support and recognition from the young generation instead of old farmers 
alone.  
 
By the 1990s Japan had moved into notable roles in a number of regional 
organizations such as the Asia Development Bank, APEC, Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), and the 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) (Pempel, 1998). Also, in the 
1990s, Japan became the world's largest creditor, an increasingly active investor in 
the United States, and a major contributor to international debt relief, financial 
institutions, and other assistance efforts. Moreover, Japan had become less dependent 
on the Western powers for resources. Oil, for example, was obtained directly from 
the producing countries and not from the Western-controlled multinational 
companies. Other important materials also came increasingly from sources other than 
the United States and its allies, while trade with the United States as a share of total 
trade dropped significantly. Thus, political leaders began to argue that in the interests 
of economic self-preservation, more attention should be paid to the financial and 
development needs of other countries, especially those that provided Japan with vital 
energy and raw material supplies.  
 
The increased Japanese internationalism was also shown through overseas 
assistance. By the early 1990s, Japan’s share of official development aid made it the 
largest or the second largest contributor worldwide. Moreover, in the 1990s, an 
increasing portion of Japanese aid was given via international financial institutions 
such as World Bank and Asia Development Bank. Uriu ( 2004, p.172) stated that in 
the war of Iraq, as early as in April 2003, Japan announced a series of small 
humanitarian aid packages. Just prior to US President George W. Bush’s visit to 
Tokyo in October 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi promised that Japan would give 
$1.5 billion for FY 2004, earmarked for the provision of electricity, water, medical 
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assistance, and education. In the end, Japan pledged a total of more than $5 billion to 
help in the reconstruction effort in Iraq over the next four years. This amount to 
about 10% of the World Bank’s initial estimate of reconstruction costs and made 
Japan the largest foreign contributor.  
 
The most important shift in its policy should be the willingness of Japan to use 
its troops overseas and the amendment of the nature of the Japan Self-Defense Force 
(JSDF). Roy (2004, p.91) argued that the JSDF has expanded their activities. Since 
1992 the JSDF has participated in UN peace-keeping operations in several points of 
the world. The JSDP also contributed to the US attack on Afghanistan after 9-11. In 
June 2003, Japan’s Parliament passed three war contingency bills. These were the 
Law regarding Response to Armed Attacks, the Law on the Establishment of the 
Security Council, and the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, 
and the Law to amend the Self-Defense Force (SDF). The law allows the government 
to put the SDF on standby when it determines that a military attack is “anticipated”.  
Some scholars, such as Pempel and Calder also stated that the active involvement in 
the international affairs is one of the tricks of the LDP-led coalition government to 
shift the society focus from domestic economic downturn to the international arena. 
 
Although postwar Japan is reputedly “disarmed”, the JSDF is substantial, with 
around 250,000 military personnel and an official annual budget of approximately 
US$50 billion, the world’s second highest. Japan has deployed some means of 
projecting military power, such as submarines armed with Harpoon missiles (Shuja, 
2004). The JSDF in March 2003 launched its first dual-use surveillance satellites to 
spy on North Korea and in 2003. Japanese fighters, with airborne refueling assistance 
from a U.S. tanker aircraft crossed the northern Pacific to participate in military 
exercises in Alaska along with contingents from the United States, Thailand, South 
Korea, Singapore, and India. This marked the first time Japanese military aircraft 
have trained in the continental United States (Roy, 2004, p.87).  
 
Moreover, Japan in 2003 decided to move ahead more aggressively on missile 
defense. The LDP-led coalition government has expressed a growing interest in a 
system since 1998, when North Korea launched a missile that flow over Japan 
territory. Early in 2003, however, Japan officials began to seriously consider 
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purchasing and deploying a U.S. made system as early as 2006. The proposed system 
would involve missiles launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers with ground-based 
Patriot missile batteries as a backup. In August 2003, The Defense Agency issued a 
plan calling for a tenfold increase in spending on missile defense, to $1.2 billion in 
2004, followed by annual outlays of $1 billion though 2007 (Uriu, 2004).  
 
 In regard to the sending troops overseas, Uriu (2004, p.177) mentioned that is it 
best explained by the U.S. war on Iraq. In early December 2003, the government 
released detailed guidelines for the eventual deployment of 1,000 SDF personnel. 
Japan then sent 550 soldiers from the Ground Self-Defense Force and 150 members 
of the Air Self-Defense Force, along with four military transport planes.  
 
To conclude, this chapter focused on the changes of the public policy paradigm 
of Japan in the pre-1990 and post-1990s. The public policy paradigm of the Japan in 
the pre-1990s period was rather a close nation with protective industrial and 
economic policy with mercantilism, anti-welfare approach towards the social-welfare 
service and pro-US approach in the foreign policy. The Japan domestic policy 
environment has been quite favorable for industrial policy and for economic policy 
generally. High priority is given in Japanese government policy making to economic, 
social welfare issues, domestic and international. Societal norms stress the 
importance of harmony through cooperation and at least form of consensus in 
Japanese society. In Japan these relationships are seen as positive-sum, not zero-sum, 
game. And business in Japan has benefited substantially from the continuance in 
power of the pro-business, conservative Liberal-Democratic party ever since 1955. 
The close connection of the big business and small business and the agricultural 
sectors provided a strong support for these public policies that were adopted by the 
government in the LDP dominant regime. We can said the LDP’s stance in public 
policy in the pre-1990s seemed to be more political than economic which the policy 
is a powerful tool for the LDP to maintain its superiority in the LDP dominance 
regime.  
 
 The change in the regime in the 1990 together with the change in the 
international environment caused substantial changes in the public policies of the 
Japan in the new LDP-lead coalition regime in the 1990s. The Japanese government 
 95
adopted a more liberalized and international approach towards the industrial and 
economic and foreign policies. The change of public policy paradigm is businesslike, 
the further enhancement in social-welfare policy and the liberalization definitely 
benefited the Japanese welfare. However, in return this also brought a blow to the 
Iron Triangle, which further loosen the cohesion of the LDP, business and agriculture 
sector and changed the rule of game in the political system in Japan. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The political status of Japan is generally described as extremely constant during 
the period of LDP dominance after its formation and coming to power in 1955. 
Because of the continuous control of the government enjoyed by the LDP for 38 
years, the sudden fall out of power of the LDP in 1993 and the long economic 
recession of Japan arrested the attention of the political scientists and economists. In 
the 1990s Japan’s political economy was sharply different from what it had been two 
or three decades earlier. In the HC, the July 1989 election represented the first time 
that the LDP was forced into a minority position. The political crisis in 1993 was 
testimony of the regime change in Japan.  
 
Regarding the change of the political situation in Japan, a considerable quantity 
literature on the political changes of Japan can be found, yet, most of them focused 
on two aspects of Japan, either from political system angle or the economic recession 
viewpoint, which cannot provide clear explanation why an unpredictable change 
happened in the political economy in Japan in the “Lost Decade” and also fail to 
provide an in-depth analysis regarding to change of Japan. Therefore, it is useful to 
provide a comprehensive explanation on the changes of Japan in a systematic way. It 
was the purpose of the current thesis to provide such a detailed explanation and 
analysis on the political change in Japan. The current research would like to argue 
that Japan underwent a process of shift in regime; the major change is the LDP 
dominant regime of the pre-1990s period transformed to a regime with the LDP less 
dominant or say a LDP-led coalitional regime in the post-1993 period. Also, why this 
change happened in Japan has been presented with detailed analysis.  
 
The concept of political regime and regime change are very useful in analysis of 
the political change of Japan in the “Lost Decade”. The definition of “regime” is very 
much linked with the norms, principles and rules of a nation, which are the so-called 
rules of the game. Political regime could be used in different levels and domains.  
Then the term “regime change” has provided the concepts of the change of the rule 
of the game in any regime, which is very favorable for analysis in comparing entire 
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systems, to study long-term change and justifies a broader scope. 
 
In the current research, the “regime” model developed by Pempel provides a 
tangible outline of the major elements of regime which are taken as the political 
institutions, the socio-economic coalitions and the public policy paradigm. Based on 
Pempel’s concept, it was argued that Japan was undergoing regime change in the 
1990s. With the guidance of the political regime change model and from the 
literature review, the change of the rules of the game in these three pillars was 
showed to be the most important factor that could explain the regime change in Japan. 
As most of the literatures regarding to the political change in Japan were published 
by the late 1990s, more updated information could be included in the current 
research in order to provide more concrete details for analysis. In the case of Japan, 
the change of the rule of the game could help to explain why there was a change of 
regime from LDP dominance in the pre-1990s to LDP-led coalitional government in 
the 1990s. 
  
The political institutions of Japan definitely underwent a regime change from 
the LDP dominance to a regime with the LDP less dominant, which was described in 
chapter 2 as a regime of LDP-led coalition rather than LDP dominance. The early 
1990s were critical for the development of the political system and the evidence 
discussed earlier provided justifications for the change of the rules of the game. The 
interrelationships of the LDP with the socio-economic coalition and public policy 
were also obvious in the sense that the changes of the LDP resulted in a change in the 
other two pillars. For example, the increasingly strong evidence of “money politics” 
associated with the LDP led to business and public disillusionment and impacted on 
the strength of the “iron triangle”, which in turn impacted back on the LDP’s election 
prospects. Together with the change of electoral system in 1994 which changed the 
rule of the game further and strengthened the existence of the coalition ruling in the 
post-1993 period.  
 
Moving on to the socio-economic coalition, as discussed in chapter 3 the 
socioeconomic coalition of the Japan in the pre-1990 period showed a close 
connection between the agricultural and business sectors (including big and small 
business), bureaucrats and the LDP through the keiretsu and the iron triangle system. 
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Close relationships of the LDP with the agricultural and business sectors resulted in a 
strong flavour to the policies advocated by the LDP, including mercantilist economic 
policies, small budget on social welfare and America-led foreign policies. In the 
post-1990 period, the rules of the game in the regime changed in that the connection 
between the agricultural sector and the LDP was greatly reduced due to the trade 
liberalization and the downgrading of the rural communities. Moreover, through the 
linkages of Japanese firms with foreign-owned firms, the keiretsu system was greatly 
diminished and big business itself has been divided into two communities – foreign 
owned and domestic companies – with tensions between them. These changes in the 
rules of the game resulted in less support for the LDP, so its influence declined and 
contributed to the regime change with the emergence of the LDP-led coalition. 
 
Regarding the public policies paradigm of Japan which was discussed in chapter 
4, Japan’s domestic policy environment had been quite favorable for industrial and 
economic policy generally in the pre-1990s. High priority was given by Japanese 
government policy-makers to developing economic aspects and less on social 
welfare issues. Mercantilism which favoured the domestic industries and prevented 
the intervention of the foreigner-owned industries existed in Japan in the pre-1990s 
period. Business in Japan benefited substantially from the continuance in power of 
the pro-business, conservative LDP. The dominance of the LDP in the pre-1990s 
resulted in the formation of public policies that favoured strong and protective 
economic policies (mercantilism) in order to put economic development as the first 
priority. In that sense, the expenditure on social and welfare policies was limited at 
that time. The postwar foreign policies of Japan were clear-cut and favoured the 
interests of the United States.  
 
Changes happened in the early 1990s in which the rule of the game in the pillar 
of the public policies paradigm changed, mercantilist economic and industrial 
policies change to less protective and more market-oriented, caused by the change in 
the international environment as well as by the coalition government. The stance of 
Japan on foreign policies in the early 1990s seemed to be more international, moving 
from followed strictly to the policies adopted by the United States to a more 
independent intention; a mix of working closely with the United States on some 
issues but acting with more independence on others. The industrial and economic 
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policies, the social and welfare policies and the foreign policies changed significantly 
in the post-1990 period and these changes of the rules of the game were the 
testimonies of the regime change, from LDP dominance to LDP-led coalition.  
 
All these are the change of the rules of the game of Japan in the 1990s. The 
regime change approach provides an ideal mode for characterizing the regime of a 
country and the theory itself provides a method to analyze the political and 
socio-economic changes of Japan. By utilizing Pempel’s framework, we analysed 
the regime change in the “political regime” domain at national level. The three main 
pillars justifies a broad scope in which the change of the rules of the game in the 
political institutions, the socio-economic coalition and the public policy help to  
explain why the LDP lost its power in the 1990s and why the LDP-led coalition 
regime emerged.  
 
It seems that in the near future, the LDP could not regain its dominance in the 
government and coalition governments are likely to continue to form in the future 
years. In terms of the socio-economic coalition, with the increase in foreign-owned 
enterprises, the traditional cohesive links between the party system and the large 
business sector will further diminish. The ways and management style of the 
foreign-owned firms might change the management style of Japanese firm. Some 
form of “iron triangle” will still exist (even though its cohesion may be reduced to a 
large extent). The LDP-led government, the bureaucracy and the business sectors are 
still the most influential parties in society. Even though the economic recession in the 
early 1990s reduced greatly the profit gained by the business sector, they are still the 
largest financial source for the political parties during election and fund-raising. Yet, 
their relations changed as the rule of the game changed and their political status is no 
longer as constant as before. 
 
In terms of public policies, Japan has been striving for a better economic 
development since the early 1990s’ economic recession. The banking system, 
especially the bad debts, is the core reason for the continued recession of Japan. 
Higher priority will be put on further enhanced the strength and competitiveness of 
Japan in the international market. Due to the rapid ageing process in Japan, resources 
and ways to handle properly the ageing issue will still be a priority for the Japanese 
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government. The resources spent on social and welfare policies should no doubt 
increase to a great extent in the near future. As for the foreign policies, moves 
towards a more clear and individualized stance on international affairs will appear in 
the future, even though a close relationship with America, especially on some large 
important issues, will still exist. 
 
 By using the theoretical mode of regime change, a more systematic and logical 
way of analyzing the recent changes of a regime in Japan was found. Political 
institutions, socio-economic coalition and public policy paradigm constituted the 
three main pillars of the regime. Consequently, two different and unique regimes in 
which the first one was from 1955 to the early 1990s (LDP one party dominance 
regime) and the second regime was from 1993 to the early 2000s (LDP-led coalition 
regime) have been defined. As the new rules of the game are shaping up the new 
regime, the study of the regime change of Japan in the “Lost Decade” will remain 
critically important for understanding the future development of Japan. This type of 
approach in turn may well have implications for examining and explaining changes 
which have been or are being undergone by other countries in which one-party 
dominant regimes lose power.  
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